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THE HIGH COST OF EDUCATION FEDERALISM
Kimberly Jenkins Robinson •

Education federalism in the United States traditionally
embraces state and local authority over education and a restricted
federal role.l Even as the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001
("NCLB")2 expanded and transformed the federal role in education,
the tradition of state and local control over education influenced key
provisions within the statute.3 Some praise the nation's longstanding approach to education federalism-which this Article
defines as an emphasis on state and local control over education and
a limited federal role-for its ability to foster local control of
education, encourage experimentation, and promote a robust
competition for excellence in education. 4 This approach to education

* Professor, University of Richmond School of Law. I am thankful for the
insightful comments of Jim Gibson, William Koski, Corinna Lain, Martha
Minow, Wendy Perdue, James Ryan, and Kevin Walsh. I am grateful for the
research assistance of Erin Weaver, Danielle Wingfield, and Melissa Wright.
1 Carl F. Kaestle, Federal Education Policy and the Changing National
Polity for Education, 1957-2007, in To EDUCATE A NATION: FEDERAL AND
NATIONAL STRATEGIES OF SCHOOL REFORM 17 (Carl F. Kaestle & Alyssa E.
Lodewick eds., 2007).
2. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.).
3. See generally PAUL MANNA, COLLISION COURSE: FEDERAL EDUCATION
POLICY MEETS STATE AND LOCAL REALITIES (2011) [hereinafter MANNA,
COLLISION COURSE]; PAUL MANNA, SCHOOL'S IN: FEDERALISM AND THE NATIONAL
EDUCATION AGENDA (2006) [hereinafter MANNA, SCHOOL'S IN]; PATRICK J.
MCGUINN, No CHILD LEFT BEHIND AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF FEDERAL
EDUCATION POLICY, 1965-2005 (2006).
4. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 49-50
(1973) ("[L]ocal control means ... the freedom to devote more money to the
education of one's children. Equally important, however, is the opportunity it
offers for participation in the decisionmaking [sic] process that determines how
those local tax dollars will be spent. . . .
Pluralism also affords some
opportunity for experimentation, innovation, and a healthy competition for
educational excellence." (citation omitted)); Wendy Parker, Connecting the Dots:
Grutter, School Desegregation, and Federalism, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1691,
1755 (2004) ('When the choice is between federal court oversight and local or
state authority over public schools, then the latter is clearly more consistent
with promoting public participation in democracy, preventing tyranny, and
encouraging experimentation."); Michael Rebell, Fiscal Equity in Education:
Deconstructing the Reigning Myths and Facing Reality, 21 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
Soc. CHANGE 691, 708 (1995) ("[L]ocal control of education remains a worthy
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federalism also is praised for how it enables local communities to
respond to local needs and promotes accountability.5 The current
structure of education federalism resembles the relationship
between the national and state governments, and like that
relationship, it seeks to capitalize on an array of viewpoints and
methods regarding the most effective approaches to education. 6
Although the nation's current approach to education federalism
undoubtedly generates some benefits, it also tolerates substantial
inequitable disparities in educational opportunity both within and
between states. 7 The reality of local control of education for many
communities means the ability to control inadequate resources that
provide many students substandard educational opportunities. s The
ideal. Local control encourages diversity, innovation, and experimentation in
education.").
5. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 50-51 (noting that through local control of
education, "[e]ach locality is free to tailor local programs to local needs");
Richard Briffault, The Role of Local Control in School Finance Reform, 24
CONN. L. REV. 773, 774, 809 (1992) (noting that some of the benefits of local
control are the ability of communities to respond effectively to local needs and
to increase accountability); Parker, supra note 4 (arguing that state and local
control of education promotes the participation of citizens in democratic
government); Rebell, supra note 4 ("Moreover, it [local control] promotes
efficiency and direct accountability to those most affected by schooling
practices-the parents and citizens who live in that particular community.
Perhaps most significantly, local control invites a high level of direct citizen
involvement at the grass-roots level. Despite its many shortcomings, the local
school district remains the most broad-based and effective vehicle for
meaningful participatory democracy in American society.").
6. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 50; Parker, supra note 4, at 1749-50 ("As
smaller entities of government, states and localities can experiment with
different approaches to maximize the opportunities for success. Lastly, and
closely related to the value of promoting states as laboratories for
experimentation, is the value of creating communities of shared interests.
Allowing experimentation at the state and local level will also allow cultural
and local diversity that can benefit any number of viewpoints.").
7. See MICHAEL A. REBELL & JESSICA R. WOLFF, MOVING EVERY CHILD
AHEAD: FROM NCLB HYPE TO MEANINGFUL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 39 (2008)
("[P]oor and minority students, whose readiness for learning is severely affected
by conditions of poverty, are nevertheless more likely than their more affluent
White peers to attend lower-quality schools-however school quality is
measured-and to lack adequate educational resources to meet their learning
needs."); JAMES E. RYAN, FivE MILES AWAY, A WORLD APART: ONE CITY, Two
SCHOOLS, AND THE STORY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY IN MODERN AMERICA
178--79 (2010); Goodwin Liu, Education, Equality, and National Citizenship,
116 YALE L.J. 330, 332 (2006).
8. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 64-65 (White, J., dissenting) ("The difficulty
with the Texas system, however, is that it provides a meaningful option to
Alamo Heights and like school districts but almost none to Edgewood and those
other districts with a low per-pupil real estate tax base. In these latter
districts, no matter how desirous parents are of supporting their schools with
greater revenues, it is impossible to do so through the use of the real estate
property tax. In these districts, the Texas system utterly fails to extend a
realistic choice to parents because the property tax, which is the only revenue-
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opportunity divide in American education continues to relegate far
too many poor and minority schoolchildren to substandard
educational opportunities.9 These communities are left behind in
the competition for educational excellence.lO In addition, highpoverty schools, particularly those within urban school districts,
regularly yield the worst academic outcomes.H

ra1smg mechanism extended to school districts, is practically and legally
unavailable."); REBELL & WOLFF, supra note 7, at 163 (''Most of the schools that
serve low-income and minority students do not have the material or human
resources to provide a meaningful educational opportunity to their students,
and many schools do not have the capacity to implement school improvement or
corrective action plans, no matter how well conceived."); Thomas Kleven,
Federalizing Public Education, 55 VILL. L. REV. 369, 393 (2010) ("State and local
financing produces substantial inequalities in per pupil educational
expenditures. Because local governments' tax bases differ widely within states,
so does their ability to raise money to fund education. As a result, the richer
school districts in which well-off children tend to live generally spend more
money on education and provide a higher quality education than the poorer
districts where the less well-off live.").
9. See THE EQUITY & ExcELLENCE CoMM'N, FoR EACH AND EVERY CHILD: A
STRATEGY FOR EDUCATION EQUITY AND EXCELLENCE 14 (2013) ("Ten million
students in America's poorest communities-and millions more Mrican
American, Latino, Asian American, Pacific Islander, American Indian and
Alaska Native students who are not poor-are having their lives unjustly and
irredeemably blighted by a system that consigns them to the lowest-performing
teachers, the most run-down facilities, and academic expectations and
opportunities considerably lower than what we expect of other students.");
REBELL & WOLFF, supra note 7, at 13 ("Glaring gaps in educational achievement
and in educational opportunity persist for the children of our nation's poor, of
our immigrants, and of our families of color."); RYAN, supra note 7, at 1.
10. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 127-28 (Marshall, J., dissenting) ("If Texas
had a system truly dedicated to local fiscal control, one would expect the quality
of the educational opportunity provided in each district to vary with the
decision of the voters in that district as to the level of sacrifice they wish to
make for public education. In fact, the Texas scheme produces precisely the
opposite result. Local school districts cannot choose to have the best education
in the State by imposing the highest tax rate. Instead, the quality of the
educational opportunity offered by any particular district is largely determined
by the amount of taxable property located in the district-a factor over which
local voters can exercise no control."); REBELL & WOLFF, supra note 7, at 13-14
("In large part, the persistent gap between the American ideal of equality in
education and the reality of starkly inadequate schooling for low-income and
minority children stems from the irony that although America's dedication to
educational equity has surpassed that of any other nation, its commitment to
equality in related areas of social welfare has lagged far behind that of other
industrialized countries ...."); Derek Black, Unlocking the Power of State
Constitutions with Equal Protection: The First Step Toward Education as a
Federally Protected Right, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1343, 1354 (2010) ("[S]tates
consistently spend less on the education of students who attend predominantly
poor and/or minority school districts. Based on the state and national averages,
we spend $908 less per pupil on students in minority schools than we do on
students in predominantly white schools.").
11. RYAN, supra note 7, at 277.
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These disparities in educational opportunity hinder schools
from fulfilling some of their essential national and institutional
Schools serve indispensable public functions within a
goals.
democratic society: they prepare students to engage in the nation's
political system in an intelligent and effective manner and transmit
the fundamental societal values that a democratic government
requires. 12 The nation also relies on its public schools as the
principal institutional guarantor of equal opportunity within
American society by serving as a mechanism to ensure that children
are not hindered in attaining their dreams by their life
circumstances,13 Americans depend on schools to address the
societal challenges created by social and economic inequality rather
than creating the extensive social welfare networks that many
industrialized countries have implemented.l4 The disparities in
educational opportunity that relegate many poor and minority
students to substandard schooling have hindered the ability of
schools to serve these functions. Indeed, rather than solve these
challenges, low graduation rates and substandard schools cost the
United States billions of dollars each year in lost tax and income
revenues, higher health care costs, food stamps, and welfare and
housing assistance, to name a few of the costs.l5
This Article will show the consistent ways that the current
understanding of education federalism within the United States has
hindered three of the major reform efforts to promote a more
equitable distribution of educational opportunity: school
desegregation, school finance litigation, and, most recently, NCLB.
In exploring how education federalism has undermined these
efforts, this Article adds to the understanding of other scholars who
have critiqued these reformsl6 and examined why the nation has

12. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 221 (1982); Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown I),
347 u.s. 483, 493 (1954).
13. Greg J. Duncan & Richard J. Murnane, Introduction: The American
Dream, Then and Now, in WHITHER OPPORTUNITY?: RISING INEQUALITY,
SCHOOLS, AND CHILDREN'S LIFE CHANCES 3, 7 (Greg J. Duncan & Richard J.
Murnane eds., 2011).
14. REBELL & WOLFF, supra note 7, at 26.
15. See Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, The Past, Present, and Future of Equal
Educational Opportunity: A Call for a New Theory of Education Federalism, 79
U. CHI. L. REV. 427, 429 (2012) (reviewing RYAN, supra note 7) (summarizing
research on the costs of substandard education).
16. For critiques of school desegregation, see, for example, Goodwin Liu,
Brown, Bollinger, and Beyond, 47 How. L.J. 705, 718-36 (2004) (critiquing the
Court's desegregation decisions for their impatience in achieving results and
their indifference to persistent inequality); Wendy Parker, The Future of School
Desegregation, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 1157, 1162-78 (2000) (noting that several of
the Court's desegregation decisions significantly lessened the burden of proving
the absence of vestiges of discrimination but that these decisions still could be
interpreted to require a demanding judicial inquiry of school desegregation);
Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, Resurrecting the Promise of Brown: Understanding
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failed to guarantee equal educational opportunity. 17 For example,
scholars have argued that the failure to undertake earnest efforts to
achieve equal educational opportunity is caused by a variety of
factors, including the lack of political will to accomplish this goal,

and Remedying How the Supreme Court Reconstitutionalized Segregated
Schools, 88 N.C. L. REV. 787, 811-37 (2010) (analyzing how some of the Court's
leading desegregation decisions sanctioned a return to segregated schools). For
critiques of Rodriguez and school finance litigation, see, for example, ERWIN
CHEMERINSKY, THE CONSERVATIVE AsSAULT ON THE CONSTITUTION 35-36 (2010)
("The Court held that there is no constitutional right to education and thus that
differentials in spending between wealthy and poor school districts within a
metropolitan area are constitutionally permissible. If I were to list the most
important, and the worst, Supreme Court decisions during my lifetime,
Rodriguez would be high on this list."); John Dinan, School Finance Litigation:
The Third Wave Recedes, in FROM SCHOOLHOUSE TO COURTHOUSE: THE
JUDICIARY'S ROLE IN AMERICAN EDUCATION 96, 96 (Joshua M. Dunn & Martin R.
West eds., 2009) [hereinafter FROM SCHOOLHOUSE TO COURTHOUSE] (addressing
how school finance litigation experienced sustained success for almost two
decades but now shows signs offaltering); Danielle Holley-Walker, A New Era
for Desegregation, 28 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 423, 456-57 (2012) (noting the tendency
of school finance cases to ensure only a minimally adequate education);
Christopher Roellke et al., School Finance Litigation: The Promises and
Limitations of the Third Wave, 79 PEABODY J. Enuc. 104, 105 (2004) ("Despite
intensified school finance litigation and legislation over the past several
decades, school systems in the United States continue their struggle to operate
equitably and adequately. The evidence is clear that these goals of equity and
adequacy have been particularly elusive for schools attended primarily by lowincome and minority children."). For critiques of NCLB, see, for example,
Regina Ramsey James, How to Mend a Broken Act: Recapturing Those Left
Behind by No Child Left Behind, 45 GONZ. L. REV. 683, 691 (2010) (''This Act
was passed in a well-intentioned, albeit misguided, effort to curtail educational
inequality. However, the NCLB Act, with all its focus on high-stakes tests as
indicators of academic success, exacerbates the problem by unduly causing
administrators, principals, teachers and most importantly students to stress
practicing skills and drills of abstract, often irrelevant-particularly from the
students' vantage point-facts likely to be tested, replacing in depth learning
with rote memorization."); James E. Ryan, The Perverse Incentives of the No
Child Left Behind Act, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 932, 934 (2004) (contending that
NCLB creates incentives for states to lower academic standards, increase school
segregation, push out low-performing students, and discourage good teachers
from taking the more challenging jobs).
17. See, e.g., REBELL & WOLFF, supra note 7, at 13-14 (noting that lowincome and minority communities are not provided equal or adequate
educational opportunity and that these communities also have not been able to
overcome such obstacles as poor health, inadequate nutrition and housing,
racism, and an unstable economy); RYAN, supra note 7, at 1 (arguing that
education policy has failed to ensure equal educational opportunity because it
has consistently sought to spare suburban schools from efforts to improve urban
schools); Black, supra note 10 (arguing that states provide inferior educational
funding to predominantly poor and minority school districts); Erwin
Chemerinsky, Lost Opportunity: The Burger Court and the Failure to Achieve
Equal Educational Opportunity, 45 MERCER L. REV. 999, 1012 (1994) (arguing
that Nixon appointees to the Supreme Court voted to uphold court decisions
that blocked legal avenues to achieve equal educational opportunity).
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the domination of suburban influences over education politics, and
the failure of the United States to create a social welfare system
that addresses the social and economic barriers that impede the
achievement of many poor and minority students. 1s In a past work,
I also explored some of the reasons that these efforts have failed to
ensure equal educational opportunity,19 In light of this literature,
education federalism undoubtedly is not the only factor that has
influenced the nation's inability to ensure equal educational
opportunity. Nevertheless, it is important to understand the
consistent ways in which education federalism has contributed to
the ineffectiveness of efforts to ensure equal educational opportunity
as scholars propose new avenues to achieve this paramount goal. In
addition, in both past and future work, I argue that the nation
should consider embracing a new framework for education
federalism that would enable the nation to more effectively achieve
its goals for public schools.2o
Understanding how education
federalism has hindered past reforms is an essential part of
exploring how education federalism should be reshaped.
In addition, this Article also briefly highlights that when the
Supreme Court and Congress limited reforms to advance equal
educational opportunity, they harkened back to an extinct model of
dual federalism and failed to acknowledge that, since the New Deal,
the nation has moved to the increasing jurisdictional partnerships
that are oftentimes labeled cooperative federalism.21 In this way,
this Article engages some of the federalism scholarship.
Furthermore, this Article notes that one possible explanation for
some of the Court's decisions is that the Court may be claiming that
federalism prevents it from acting when the Court lacks the will or

18. See, e.g., REBELL & WOLFF, supra note 7, at 13-14 (noting that the lack
of a comprehensive welfare system in the United States has created barriers to
success for low-income and minority children); RYAN, supra note 7, at 272
(''Middle-income and more affluent families, mostly white, have largely walled
themselves off in separate school districts, leaving to others the task of
educating low-income students, most of whom are Mrican-American or
Hispanic. For fifty years, the law and politics of educational opportunity have
operated to protect the schools behind those walls."); Erwin Chemerinsky, The
Deconstitutionalization of Education, 36 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 111, 111-12 (2004)
(discussing the failure of public officials to address school segregation and
school inequality due to political unpopularity of "any systematic attempt to
deal with education").
19. Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, The Case for a Collaborative Enforcement
Model for a Federal Right to Education, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1653, 1660-81
(2007).
20. See Robinson, supra note 15, at 433; Kimberly Jenkins Robinson,
Reconstructing Education Federalism (Apr. 6, 2013) (unpublished manuscript)
(on file with author).
21. ERIN RYAN, FEDERALISM AND THE TuG OF WAR WITHIN, at xiv (2011);
ROBERT A. SCHAPIRO, POLYPHONIC FEDERALISM: TOWARD THE PROTECTION OF
FuNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 6 (2009).
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an interest in ensuring that equal educational opportunity becomes
a reality for all schoolchildren. Although it would be impossible to
confirm if this explanation is accurate, this Article identifies the
evidence that suggests that this behavior by the Court may be
occurring. After noting this possibility, this Article then takes the
Court at its word that education federalism is driving its decisions
while exploring the ramifications of the Court's decisions for equal
educational opportunity.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I examines how
education federalism functioned as one of the critical impediments
to school desegregation. Part II analyzes how education federalism
has handcuffed the reach of school finance litigation. Part III
critiques how education federalism has undermined the
effectiveness of NCLB. This analysis reveals how the interrelated
interests in maintaining the current balance of power between the
federal and state governments and in preserving local control of
education have limited the effectiveness of these reforms. By
examining how education federalism has served as one of the central
obstructions to reforms that sought to ensure equal educational
opportunity, this Article concludes that future efforts to advance
equal educational opportunity must undertake an analysis of how
education federalism can be restructured to support all children
receiving an equal opportunity to obtain an excellent education.
I. EDUCATION FEDERALISM AND SCHOOL DESEGREGATION

School desegregation served as a vehicle for ending the secondclass citizenship of African Americans that Plessy v. Ferguson's
separate-but-equal policy sanctioned.22 The Court's decision in
Brown v. Board of Education (Brown [)23 struck down segregated
schools as unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause.24
Yet, the implementation of this decision was eventually hampered
by a variety of factors, including massive resistance.25
To
understand how the Court privileged education federalism over the
equal educational opportunity that school desegregation sought to
ensure, this Part first describes the Court's eventual demanding
interpretation of the Brown decisions that required integrated
schools and an elimination of all traces of discrimination.
This Part then identifies the key desegregation decisions that
reveal two intimately interrelated education federalism interests
that influenced the decisions that substantially limited the
22. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550-52 (1896), overruled by
Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown[), 347 U.S. 483 (1954); RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE
JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S
STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 709, 748 (1976).
23. 347
483.
24. Id. at 488, 495.
25. See KLUGER, supra note 22, at 751.

u.s.
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implementation of effective desegregation plans. First, the Court
repeatedly noted the importance of local control of education and
that it did not want desegregation to interfere with this important
tradition of American education. Second, the Court did not want to
disrupt the existing balance of power between the federal and state
governments regarding education. Ultimately, the Court concluded
in these cases that these interests outweighed the interest in
ensuring that the plaintiffs could attend desegregated schools
offering equal educational opportunity. Thus, they reflect the
Court's deliberate placement of education federalism above equal
educational opportunity on the hierarchy of interests within
American education and society. 26 The lower courts took note of the
Court's preferences and its focus on local control and were
encouraged to terminate desegregation orders.27
Finally, this Part concludes by acknowledging that the Supreme
Court's 2007 decision in Parents Involved in Community Schools v.
Seattle School District No. J2B may plausibly be read to suggest that
education federalism was simply used as a convenient cover for a
Court that lacked a strong commitment to effective school
desegregation. However, a plausible alternative reading of the
decision acknowledges that education federalism remained
important but was outweighed by an interest in ending the use of
racial classifications.

A. How Education Federalism Impeded Effective School
Desegregation
The Court's 1954 decision in Brown I insisted that educational
opportunity must be provided "on equal terms" and that segregation
of educational facilities had "no place" in American society.29 In
reaching this decision, the Court noted the importance of education
26. As will be discussed in Part I.B, the Court's most recent decision
regarding school integration departed from its prior insistence on local control
of schools. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551
U.S. 701, 732-35 (2007) (striking down two voluntary school integration efforts
that considered the race of students because it found that the plans were not
narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling state interest); James E. Ryan, The
Real Lessons of School Desegregation, in FROM SCHOOLHOUSE TO COURTHOUSE,
supra note 16, at 89 (noting that this decision represents a departure from the
Court's prior insistence on local decision making of schools). Although the
decision does not offer local control of schools as the reason for doing so, like the
desegregation cases discussed in the text, the decision consistently assigns a
low priority to integrated schools and the equal educational opportunity that
such schools can provide. See Robinson, supra note 16, at 838-39.
27. See Bradley W. Joondeph, Skepticism and School Desegregation, 76
WASH. U. L.Q. 161, 166 (1998); Ronald Turner, The Voluntary School
Integration Cases and the Contextual Equal Protection Clause, 51 How. L.J.
251, 295--96 (2008).
28. 551 u.s. 701 (2007).
29. Brown I, 347 U.S. at 493-95.
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and the harms that segregation inflicted upon Mrican American
schoolchildren.3o
In so doing, the Court opined that equal
educational opportunity required desegregated schools.
However, this unequivocal condemnation of segregation was
quickly undermined in 1955 when the Court, in Brown II, explained
that after districts had made "a prompt and reasonable start toward
full compliance," school districts could desegregate "with all
deliberate speed."3 1 The Court's decision in Brown II also invited
delays in desegregation by placing school districts that violated the
Constitution in charge of developing the appropriate remedy for the
segregation and by failing to issue guidance on the scope of the
desegregation obligation, the timing by which desegregation must be
completed, and the appropriate remedy for noncompliant districts.3 2
Despite making it clear that open defiance was unacceptable, 33 the
Court's decisions and inactions for over a decade after Brown I
worsened the delay sanctioned by Brown II. 34 In response to the
Court's gradualism and limited support for desegregation from the
executive branch, school districts adopted a variety of tactics to
forestall school desegregation and maintain the status quo. 35
Although the pace of desegregation slowly began to increase a
decade after the Brown decisions, a mere one percent of Mrican
American students were enrolled in desegregated schools in the
South at the time.36 Some scholars contend that without its own
enforcement authority or any congressional action, and with limited
presidential support, the Court lacked the authority and the
inclination to go beyond this limited change.37
The glacial pace of desegregation and the civil rights movement
eventually led the legislative and executive branches to demand
effective school desegregation.as Congress passed the Civil Rights

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.

Id. at 493-94.

Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294, 300-01 (1955).
See Robinson, supra note 16, at 798.
See, e.g., Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
Robinson, supra note 16, at 802. For a discussion of the ways that
Brown II and the Court's actions and inactions slowed the process of school
desegregation, see id. at 797-803.
35. See id. at 800. For a discussion of the ways that school districts delayed
and avoided school desegregation after Brown II, see id. at 802-03.
36. See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE
SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 349 (2004); GERALD N.
ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 52
(2d ed. 2008).
37. See MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE CIVIL
RIGHTS MOVEMENT 123 (2007); CHARLES J. OGLETREE, JR., ALL DELIBERATE
SPEED: REFLECTIONS ON THE FIRST HALF CENTURY OF BROWN V. BOARD OF
EDUCATION 124 (2004); STEPHEN L. WASBY ET AL., DESEGREGATION FROM BROWN
TO ALEXANDER 124 (1977).
38. See KLARMAN, supra note 37, at 101, 123-24; RYAN, supra note 7, at 59;
Robinson, supra note 16, at 807.
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Act of 1964 and authorized the Attorney General to initiate action
against a school district that denied admission to a school on the
basis of race or otherwise violated equal protection of the laws.39
The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare ("HEW") issued
guidance in 1965 requiring districts to take action that would create
integrated schools, but this guidance initially emphasized whether
school officials were acting in good faith and permitted the use of
freedom of choice plans that were typically ineffective.4o After the
Court's decision in Green v. County School Board of New Kent
County, 41 which is described below, HEW subsequently
strengthened its guidance to forbid the use of freedom of choice if it
failed to eliminate the vestiges of segregation. 42
The Court also eventually demanded reliable and long-standing
results from desegregation plans in the 1968 Green decision and the
1971 decision in Swann u. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of
Education. 4 3 In Green, the Court finally demanded that school
districts end the delays in desegregation and immediately
implement an effective plan. 44 The Court clarified school districts'
desegregation obligation by identifying six areas that must be
desegregated: faculty, staff, the assignment of students to particular
schools, extracurricular activities, facilities, and transportation. 45
In defining the scope of the obligation of school districts, the Court
clarified that districts must create integrated schools that
eliminated all of the harmful effects of segregation and forbade
subsequent discrimination. 46 Green signaled that desegregation
plans would be measured based on their results and that integrated
schools were the ultimate goal.47
Swann further emphasized the importance of results by
sanctioning the use of ratios to guide desegregation, urging the
elimination of one-race schools whenever possible, approving of
revising attendance zones, and upholding busing as a desegregation
tool when busing did not impair the educational experience or

39. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(c)-6(a) (2006). The statute also forbids recipients of
federal financial assistance from discriminating on the basis of race, color, or
national origin. Id. § 2000(d).
40. See Robinson, supra note 16, at 807.
41. 391 u.s. 430 (1968).
42. See Robinson, supra note 16, at 807.
43. 402 u.s. 1 (1971).
44. Green, 391 U.S. at 439.
45. Id. at 435.
46. Id. at 438 & n.4, 442. Given these requirements, the Court upheld the
plaintiffs' challenge to a freedom-of-choice plan that ostensibly allowed students
to attend a school of their choice because under the plan, eighty-five percent of
the Mrican American students in the district were still attending all-African
American schools. ld. at 437, 441.
47. See Robinson, supra note 16, at 805-07.
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health of schoolchildren.48 Both Green and Swann were crucial in
providing much-needed guidance on the scope of the obligation to
desegregate and the necessity of immediate implementation of
desegregation plans that created integrated schools. 49 Ultimately,
the Civil Rights Act of 1964, enforcement action by HEW, and Green
and Swann notified school districts that they must end the delay
and avoidance tactics of the past and resulted in numerous judicial
desegregation decrees.50
Yet, federal support for meaningful desegregation proved to be
quite short lived. Less than a year after Green, the nation elected
Richard Nixon to serve as President, and, once in office, he upheld
his campaign promise to slow the pace of school desegregation. 51 He
ordered both HEW and the Department of Justice to pull back on
their desegregation efforts and to contest the position of the NAACP
in some desegregation litigation. Nixon's election as President
ended the very short time frame in which all three branches of
government acted aggressively to ensure effective school
desegregation. 52
The Court's position also shifted shortly thereafter, and it began
to privilege education federalism over the Court's prior goal of an
effective desegregation plan that sought to ensure equal educational
opportunity. In 197 4, the Court's decision in Milliken v. Bradley
(Milliken l) erected what proved to be a virtually insurmountable
barrier to effective desegregation in many northern districts.53 In
Milliken I, the Court overturned a lower court desegregation plan
for the Detroit public school system that included an interdistrict
remedy.5 4 The lower courts found that the federal government, the
school district, and the state of Michigan had intentionally created
segregated schools; the courts responded by implementing a
remedial interdistrict plan because an intradistrict plan would be
ineffective and would effectively annul the decision in Brown. 55 The
Supreme Court rejected the plan and held that an interdistrict
remedy could only be implemented if the neighboring districts or the
state had committed acts that intentionally segregated students

48. Swann, 402 U.S. at 16, 25-31.
49. For a full discussion of the importance of Green and Swann, see
Robinson, supra note 16, at 805-09.
50. See KLARMAN, supra note 37, at 123-24; Robinson, supra note 16, at
810-11.
51. See RYAN, supra note 7, at 59-60.
52. Id. at 59.
53. See generally Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken I), 418 U.S. 717 (197 4). For
an extensive discussion of the barriers that Milliken I created for integration,
see RYAN, supra note 7, at 105-08; Robinson, supra note 16, at 813-19.
54. Milliken I, 418 U.S. at 746-48.
55. See id. at 724-25; Bradley v. Milliken, 484 F.2d 215, 249 (6th Cir. 1973)
(en bane), rev'd, 418 U.S. 717.
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across districts and thereby committed an interdistrict
constitutional violation. 56
The Court's rejection of an effective desegregation plan
emphasized two closely interrelated concerns that implicate
education federalism. First, the Court heralded the importance of
local control of education.s7 The Court rejected the district court's
willingness to treat district lines as creatures of administrative ease
because the lower court's approach was "contrary to the history of
public education in our country."ss Indeed, in the Court's view, "[n]o
single tradition in public education is more deeply rooted than local
control over the operation of schools; local autonomy has long been
thought essential both to the maintenance of community concern
and support for public schools and to [the] quality of the educational
process."59 The Court characterized the education system in
Michigan as one that provided extensive local control in a fashion
similar to other statesGo_a characterization that Justice Marshall
in dissent vociferously challenged6 1-and noted that the proposed
remedy would disrupt the organization of school districts by
consolidating fifty-four districts into one large school district.62
Second, the Court's opinion also reflected its concerns about
substantially altering the balance of power between the federal and
state governments as it relates to education. In raising numerous
concerns about how the proposed new school district would be
governed, the Court stated that it was "obvious from the scope of the
interdistrict remedy itself that absent a complete restructuring of
the laws of Michigan relating to school districts the District Court
will become first, a de facto 'legislative authority' to resolve these
complex questions, and then the 'school superintendent' for the
entire area."63 Such an arrangement would dramatically shift the
balance of power between the federal government and state and
local governments-a change that the Court undoubtedly viewed as
undesirable.
Milliken I serves as one of the primary examples of how the
Court privileged the current understanding of education federalism
over the equal educational opportunity that Brown I sought to
guarantee. Numerous scholars have noted the near-fatal impact of

56. Milliken I, 418 U.S. at 744-47.
57. See id. at 741.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 741-42.
60. See id. at 742-43. The Court reached this conclusion "despite the fact
that school districts in Michigan were creatures of the state, not the local,
government ...." RYAN, supra note 7, at 101-02.
61. See Milliken I, 418 U.S. at 793-97 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 742-43 (majority opinion).
63. Id. at 743-44.
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Milliken I on desegregation.64 The decision removed the possibility
of developing effective remedies in many districts throughout the
North and West because the districts educated an insufficient
number of white students to create integrated schools. 65 Only a
small handful of districts could prove an interdistrict violation. 66
Despite the fact that the Court had held in Green that districts had
a constitutional obligation to remedy segregation by creating
integrated schools,67 the schoolchildren in the overwhelming
majority of districts in the North and West did not receive an
integrated education. 68
Several additional Supreme Court desegregation decisions also
continued to exalt the Court's understanding of education
64. See, e.g., RYAN, supra note 7, at 105 ("It is difficult to exaggerate the
consequences of Milliken, which is easily the most important desegregation
decision aside from Brown. . . . On the whole, ... suburban school districts
received a pass from busing plans. Without the participation of the suburbs,
busing was bound to be a failure." (footnotes omitted)); Joondeph, supra note 27,
at 164; Robinson, supra note 16, at 814 ("Milliken I erected an almost uniformly
insurmountable barrier to interdistrict remedies .... "); Id. at 818-19 nn.20910 (citing scholars who argue that Milliken I was one of the primary causes of
desegregation's failure).
65. Molly S. McUsic, The Law's Role in the Distribution of Education: The
Promises and Pitfalls of School Finance Litigation, in LAw AND ScHOOL REFORM:
SIX STRATEGIES FOR PROMOTING EDUCATIONAL EQmTY 88, 102 (Jay P. Heubert
ed., 1999).
66. See RYAN, supra note 7, at 105 (noting that only four metropolitan
areas-Little Rock, Indianapolis, Wilmington, and Louisville-ordered
interdistrict busing, St. Louis adopted interdistrict busing in a desegregation
settlement, and a few additional districts adopted busing because the city and
suburbs were located in the same school district).
67. See Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd. of New Kent Cnty., 391 U.S. 430,438 & n.4,
442 (1968).
68. See Chemerinsky, supra note 18, at 118; Robinson, supra note 16, at
816. In this way, the Court's protection of local control in Milliken I preserved
the autonomy of predominantly white suburban neighborhoods and the
preferences of middle-income whites. RYAN, supra note 7, at 103-04; see also
Liu, supra note 16, at 726. Furthermore, the negative impact of Milliken rs
preference for local control over integrated schools was not mitigated by
Milliken Irs approval of an alternative desegregation plan that included
compensatory programs such as a remedial reading program and professional
development for teachers and administrators. See Milliken v. Bradley (Milliken
II), 433 U.S. 267, 272-77, 287-88 (1977). Numerous school districts sought
Milliken II funding as an alternative to busing, because busing was futile due to
the high concentrations of minority students within a district. See Ryan, supra
note 26, at 73, 84. However, Milliken II funding proved ineffective in making a
substantial impact on these schools and did not substantially improve student
achievement. See RYAN, supra note 7, at 108, 159. Moreover, the Milliken II
opinion reaffirmed the Court's emphasis in Milliken I on local control of schools
as one of the paramount concerns of a district court when it fashioned a remedy
for intentional segregation. See Milliken II, 433 U.S. at 280-81 ("[F]ederal
courts in devising a remedy must take into account the interests of state and
local authorities in managing their own affairs, consistent with the
Constitution.").
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federalism at the expense of the equal educational opportunity that
effective school desegregation would have provided. In Board of
Education of Oklahoma City Public Schools, Independent School
District No. 89 v. Dowell, 69 the Court held that federal courts
assessing whether a school district should be released from court
supervision should determine whether the district had complied
with the desegregation decree in good faith and "whether the
vestiges of past discrimination had been eliminated to the extent
practicable."70 The shift in emphasis away from maintaining
integrated schools is evident from the Court's emphasis on this new
standard and its silence about the large number of single-race
schools that would result under the school board's proposed
neighborhood assignment plan. n
In stating its reasons for adopting this more lenient standard
for assessing the implementation of desegregation, the Court in
Dowell once again trumpeted both the importance of local control of
the schools and maintaining the balance of power between federal
and state authorities as the principal rationales for its decision. 72
By changing the standard for assessing a desegregation plan to
emphasize the good faith of the school districts and the practicalities
of implementation, the Court privileged the federalism interests
over the Court's prior insistence in Green and Swann on an effective
plan that created integrated schools and uprooted all traces of
unlawful segregation, including single-race schools.73 The effect of
the Court's decision was to sanction termination of court oversight of
a desegregation decree if a school district attempted unsuccessfully
to integrate its schools. 74 Following the opinion, research revealed
that other federal courts accepted inadequate results from

69. 498 u.s. 237 (1991).
70. Id. at 249-50.
71. See Robinson, supra note 16, at 823-24. Indeed, under the plan that
the school district sought to implement, over half of the district's African
American students would attend schools that enrolled over ninety percent
African American students, and more than half of the elementary schools would
be over ninety percent single-race schools. Dowell, 498 U.S. at 242; Dowell v.
Bd. of Educ. of Okla. City Pub. Sch., Indep. Dist. No. 89, 890 F.2d 1483, 1487
(lOth Cir. 1989), reu'd, 498 U.S. 237; Robinson, supra note 16, at 822-23. This
swift return to a substantial number of single-race schools prompted the Tenth
Circuit to reject the school district's proposed plan. Dowell, 498 U.S. at 243-44.
Once the Court sent the case back to the lower court, the lower court
determined that the school district had met the new standard and the district's
neighborhood attendance plan resulted in the anticipated return to more than
half one-race elementary schools. See Bradley W. Joondeph, Missouri v.
Jenkins and the De Facto Abandonment of Court-Enforced Desegregation, 71
WASH. L. REV. 597, 655 (1996).
72. See Dowell, 498 U.S. at 248.
73. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15, 26
(1971); Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd. of New Kent Cnty., 391 U.S. 430, 437-39 (1968).
74. See Parker, supra note 16, at 1165-67.
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desegregation plans, including accepting segregation of staff and
faculty that tracked the racial concentration of students within a
school that was undoubtedly within the control of school districts. 75
Thus, as in Milliken I, the Court in Dowell elevated the interests of
education federalism over and above the interest in ensuring that all
students receive equal educational opportunity.76
The Court similarly made education federalism interests
paramount to equal educational opportunity in its decision in
Freeman v. Pitts.n In Freeman, the Court considered whether
school districts must desegregate all of the Green factors
simultaneously and maintain desegregated schools for a few years
as the lower court had required. 78 The Court rejected any need for a
school district that had intentionally segregated students to be
completely desegregated for any length of time and instead held that
federal courts could release school districts from court oversight of
the Green factors in an incremental fashion. 79 Like in its opinion in
Dowell, the Court underscored the consideration of the good faith
compliance with court orders rather than the district's success at
effectively eliminating all vestiges of discrimination.8o
What is remarkable about Freeman is that the Court openly
acknowledged the continued effects of past discrimination but
disclaimed any need or responsibility for the school board to remedy
those effects despite prior opinions that placed this responsibility on
intentionally discriminatory school boards. 81
The Court
unequivocally admitted that "vestiges of past segregation by state
decree do remain in our society and in our schools. Past wrongs to
the black race, wrongs committed by the State and in its name, are a
stubborn fact of history. And stubborn facts of history linger and
persist."82 Nevertheless, the Court opined that the good faith
compliance of the school board served as a sufficient basis to
terminate the board's responsibility for racial segregation in the
district and to shift that responsibility to demographic factors

75. See Robinson, supra note 16, at 824.
76. See Parker, supra note 16, at 1166, 1178 (noting that the Court used
the importance of local control of schools as a reason to absolve or pardon the
segregation that remained in the schools); Robinson, supra note 16, at 824-25
("The emphasis on local control exempted defendants from having to address
persistent racial segregation and expressed a 'value choice' by the Court that
the need to end court-supervised desegregation was paramount and that efforts
to desegregate could be abandoned." (footnotes omitted)).
77. 503 U.S. 467, 489 (1992).
78. See id. at 471.
79. Id.
80. See id. at 491-92.
81. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15
(1971); Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd. of New Kent Cnty., 391 U.S. 430, 438 & n.4
(1968).
82. Freeman, 503 U.S. at 495.
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beyond the district's control.S3 The Court did not explain how the
mere passage of time heals the ongoing effects of past
discrimination. Instead, it appears that the Court simply believed
that the time for desegregation had come and gone and that the
nation needed to move on to other more pressing matters.s4
In upholding the validity of partial withdrawal of court
supervision over desegregating school districts, the Court again
emphasized the importance of returning the school district to local
control. 85 Indeed, although the Court acknowledged that court
intervention in school desegregation seeks both to remedy the
constitutional violation and to restore state and local authority over
the schools, the Court emphasized the primacy of the local control
objective by describing local control as "the ultimate objective" of
school desegregation.ss
The Court sanctioned incremental
termination of court supervision as one way to uphold this "vital
national tradition."S 7 Indeed, the Court opinion makes clear that
the value of local control of schools outweighed the need to hold the
school district responsible for the effects of its discrimination or to
maintain a completely desegregated school district for even one day,
let alone one school year.ss Thus, Freeman provides another
example of the Court privileging education federalism interests over
an effective desegregation plan that would offer students equal
educational opportunity.

83. See Parker, supra note 16, at 1170-71; James E. Ryan, The Limited
Influence of Social Science Evidence in Modern Desegregation Cases, 81 N.C. L.
REV. 1659, 1671 (2003). The Court justified incremental termination of court
supervision by disclaiming any necessary connection between demographic
shifts and an intentional constitutional violation. See Freeman, 503 U.S. at
496. The Court explained that as years increase since the violation, the
likelihood decreases that the violation caused existing racial imbalances in
schools. !d.
84. In contrast, the Justices who concurred in the judgment that districts
could be incrementally released from court supervision criticized the majority's
failure to recognize that the school district's maintenance of Mrican American
schools and white schools may have influenced the demographic changes within
the district. See Freeman, 503 U.S. at 515 (Blackmun, J., concurring). The
concurring Justices further noted that the school district remained responsible
for remedying the effect of segregation on the school system given the Court's
prior requirements in cases like Green that demanded that school boards
eliminate all effects of their prior discrimination. See id. at 511, 514.
85. See id. at 489 (majority opinion) ("Partial relinquishment of judicial
control, where justified by the facts of the case, can be an important and
significant step in fulfilling the district court's duty to return the operations and
control of schools to local authorities.").
86. See id. (emphasis added).
87. See id. at 489-90 (quoting Dayton Bd. of Educ. v. Brinkman, 433 U.S.
406, 410 (1977)).
88. See id. at 509 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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Finally, the Court's decision in Missouri v. JenkinsB9 revealed a
similar preference for education federalism interests over an
effective desegregation plan. In Jenkins, the lower courts had
ordered the state to remedy its intentional segregation of students
in the Kansas City, Missouri, school district and the resulting white
flight and substandard educational achievement by improving the
educational opportunities in the district so that white students
would be voluntarily attracted back to the district. 90 The lower
courts found that an efficacious desegregation remedy was
unattainable without an interdistrict approach that drew white
students into the mostly minority school district. 91 Nevertheless,
the Supreme Court overturned the plan because the goal of
attracting students back to the district-even on a voluntary basiswas not justified in the absence of evidence that the state had
intentionally segregated students between districts.92
Like Milliken, Dowell, and Freeman before it, the Court in
Jenkins emphasized the importance of local control of education
rather than lasting and meaningful desegregation.93 The Court
noted that the programs required by the lower courts to improve the
school district and its attractiveness to white students in
surrounding school districts, such as raising teacher salaries and
improving the quality of the education programs, increased the
school district's reliance on the state and ultimately on the district
court for oversight.94 This reliance undermined the "vital national
tradition" of local control over schools.95 Rather than proposing an
alternative effective remedy that would integrate the heavily
minority school district, the Court invalidated the remedial
programs and efforts to improve the schools and the students' test
scores while repeatedly reminding the federal courts that they must
work to reinstate state and local authority over the school system
once the system is in compliance with the Constitution.96
The emphasis on local control of education in the Court's
decisions in Milliken, Dowell, Freeman, and Jenkins harkened back
to dual federalism's insistence that the federal government and the
89. 515 u.s. 70 (1995).
90. Jenkins v. Missouri, 11 F.3d 755, 759 (8th Cir. 1993), rev'd, 515 U.S.
70.
91. See Jenkins, 515 U.S. at 90-91, 94.
92. See id. at 94-99.
93. See id. at 98-99, 102.
94. Id. at 99.
95. Id.
96. See id. at 99, 102. However, even if one accepts that local control of
education was the norm when Milliken I was decided-a contention that I
dispute in the text, see infra text accompanying notes 98-103--other research
has demonstrated that, by the time that Jenkins was rendered, local control no
longer served as the principal organizing principle for school governance in the
United States. See Liu, supra note 16, at 731.
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state governments divide authority based on subject matter.97
However, consistent with the demise of dual federalism and the rise
of cooperative federalism,9B education law and policy at the time of
these decisions had evolved such that, at a minimum, federal
authority had been sanctioned and deemed essential to ensuring
equal educational opportunity. This occurred not only through the
landmark Brown decisions and other desegregation decisions that
used federal power to ensure integrated schools but also through the
Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 ("ESEA'') and its
reauthorizations that marshaled federal authority to assist lowincome students;99 numerous additional federal education laws on
issues of equal opportunity for girls and women, wo disabled
students,lDl and English language learners;102 and federal
enforcement of these laws by the U.S. Department of Education. In
the Milliken, Dowell, Freeman, and Jenkins decisions, this
insistence on a dualist understanding of education failed to protect
the right to attend a nondiscriminatory school system, just as it has
failed to protect individual rights in other areas.1oa
These decisions-along with several other factors, such as the
retreat of many white and middle class families to the suburbs and
the intermittent support for federal action by the executive and
legislative branches-have led to resegregation of many of the
nation's schoolsJ04 Despite growing diversity in the public school
population, school segregation has been increasing in recent decades

97. RYAN, supra note 21; SCHAPIRO, supra note 21, at 3.
98. See RYAN, supra note 21.
99. See Derek W. Black, The Congressional Failure to Enforce Equal
Protection Through the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, 90 B.U. L.
REV. 313, 336-39 (2010) (noting that the original intent and structure of Title I
was to provide assistance to low-income students but also analyzing how
Congress diluted and undermined this purpose over time).
100. See Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681
(2006).
101. See Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 20 U.S. C. § 1400 (2006)
(previously Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No.
94-142, 89 Stat. 773).
102. See Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 566-68 (1974) (noting that Title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and HEW guidelines interpreting that law required
school districts receiving federal financial assistance to rectify any language
barrier that impeded English language learners' access to education).
103. See SCHAPIRO, supra note 21 (noting how reliance on dual federalism
has led to "mistaken rulings and bad policy" and has been used as a reason for
striking down "statutes keeping guns out of schools, protecting women from
violence, preserving intellectual property from state infringement, and
requiring compensation for state employees for workplace wrongs ranging from
age and disability discrimination to failure to honor minimum wage and
overtime requirements" (footnotes omitted)).
104. GARY 0RFIELD ET AL.,
THE CIVIL RIGHTS
PROJECT,
E
PLURIBUS ... SEPARATION: DEEPENING DOUBLE SEGREGATION FOR MORE
STUDENTS, at xvii-xix (2012).

2013]

HIGH COST OF EDUCATION FEDERALISM

305

and has led to increasingly racially isolated schoolsJ05 For instance,
the percentage of Latino and African American students who attend
schools composed of 90%-100% minority students has consistently
grown since the 1991-92 school year. 106 In the 2009-10 school year,
43.1% of Latino students and 38.1% of African American students
attended schools in which 90%-100% of the students are minorities,
up from 33.9% and 32.7% respectively in 1991-92.107 In addition,
the percentage of poor students has grown significantly in the last
three decades, with the average African American and Hispanic
student attending a school that was one-third poor students in the
early 1990s while today these students typically attend a school
with two-thirds poor studentsJOS These trends are made even more
troubling when one considers research that consistently documents
the harms of racial isolation and the benefits of diverse schools.l09
Furthermore, research reveals that concentrated poverty has a
stronger relationship to inequality in education than racial
segregation_llO Education federalism contributed to these troubling
trends by serving as one of the impediments to school desegregation.
The next Subpart considers whether the Supreme Court's
decision in Parents Involved establishes that the Court's professed
concerns about education federalism merely disguised its lack of
interest in meaningful desegregation.

B.

Parents Involved and Education Federalism
The Court's decision in Parents Involved in Community Schools
v. Seattle School District No. 1 can be viewed as a departure from
the Court's prior interest in preserving local control of public
schools.lll In Parents Involved, the Court struck down voluntary
student assignment plans that were adopted by the school districts
in Seattle and Louisville because the districts failed to prove that
the use of race was necessary and that the districts had given goodfaith consideration to race-neutral alternatives.n2 The decision
departs from past decisions' emphasis on local control because the
Court refused to defer to the decision of the school boards on their

105. Id. at 75-76.
106. See id. at 19 tbl.3.
107. See id. at 19 tbl.2.
108. Id. at 76.
109. See Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, The Constitutional Future of RaceNeutral Efforts to Achieve Diversity and Avoid Racial Isolation in Elementary
and Secondary Schools, 50 B.C. L. REV. 277, 327-35 (2009).
110. See ORFIELD ET AL., supra note 104, at 76 (citing Sean F. Reardon et al.,
The Changing Structure of School Segregation: Measurement and Evidence of
Multiracial Metropolitan-Area School Segregation, 1989-1995, 37 DEMOGRAPHY
351 (2000)).
111. See Ryan, supra note 26, at 73, 89.
112. Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701,
733-35 (2007).
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need for the plan and the ineffectiveness of race-neutral
alternatives, despite being urged to do so in numerous briefs.ll3 The
refusal to reaffirm local control may suggest that the Court's prior
interest in preserving local control may have simply represented a
convenient cover for its lack of willingness to ensure effective school
desegregation,114 Indeed, elsewhere I have argued that Parents
Involved merely continued the Court's affirmation of a return to
segregated schools.115
Nevertheless, assuming for the sake of argument that the
Court's interest in the preservation of state and local control was
genuine in prior cases, an alternative interpretation of Parents
Involved also should be considered. Parents Involved may simply
reveal that even the strong preference for local control does not
outweigh the Court's increasingly stronger preference for an end to
the use of race-based classifications,116 The plurality admonished
districts to end the use of classifications when it stated that "[t]he
way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop
discriminating on the basis of race."ll7 Although Justice Kennedy
wrote separately to reaffirm that districts may continue to adopt
student assignment plans to reduce racial isolation and promote
diversity,ns he has yet to review an affirmative action plan that
meets the highly demanding criteria that he applies to race-based
action.ll9 Indeed, his questions in the Fisher v. University of Texas
at Austin120 oral argument suggest that he will vote to strike down
the use of race in that case even though it was limited to a small
number of students and adopted only after the University of Texas

113. See, e.g., Brief of the NAACP as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Respondents at 6, Parents Involved, 551 U.S. 701 (Nos. 05-908, 05-915), 2006
WL 2927073, at *6, *11; Brief of The Nat'l Parent Teacher Ass'n as Amicus
Curiae in Support of Respondents at 18, Parents Involved, 551 U.S. 701 (Nos.
05-908, 05-915), 2006 WL 2882699, at *18; Brief of Nat'l Sch. Bds. Ass'n et al. as
Amici Curiae in Support of Respondents at 3, Parents Involved, 551 U.S. 701
(Nos. 05-908, 05-915), 2006 WL 2925968, at *3.
114. See Ryan, supra note 26, at 89-91 (noting that the desegregation cases
do not prove that the Court cannot accomplish social change but instead show
that "the Court was unwilling to press hard to achieve lasting school
integration").
115. See Robinson, supra note 16, at 837-38.
116. See City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 505-06 (1989);
DONALD LIVELY, THE CONSTITUTION, RACE, AND RENEWED RELEVANCE OF
ORIGINAL INTENT 187 (2008) ("The Court's investment in constitutional color
blindness in the late twentieth century was the precursor of growing references
to a post-racial society in the early twenty-first century.").
117. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 748.
118. See id. at 787-89 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
119. See Adam Liptak, Justices Take Up Race as a Factor in College Entry,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2012, at Al.
120. 631 F.3d 213 (5th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S.Ct. 1536 (2012)
(mem.).
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had attempted to achieve diversity through other means.121 Under
this reading of Parents Involved, ending the use of racial
classifications-or one that effectively accomplishes that under
Justice Kennedy's approach-outweighed the still-substantial
interest in local control.
Ultimately, although one can plausibly read Parents Involved as
suggesting that local control did not serve as a paramount interest
in the preceding school desegregation cases, the decision does not
disprove that local control and maintaining the existing balance of
federal and state authority served as important interests that
limited the reach of school desegregation. These interests may still
have guided the Court's decisions on school desegregation from
Milliken I onward. Instead, Parents Involved may reveal that
although these interests remain essential, even they must yield to
other predominant principles in a particular case.
The next Part explores the influence of education federalism on
school finance litigation.
II. EDUCATION FEDERALISM AND SCHOOL FINANCE LITIGATION
Once the attention shifted away from school desegregation,
some reformers pursued school finance litigation to challenge
disparities in educational opportunity.l22 These reformers scored an
initial victory in 1971 in the California Supreme Court's decision in
Serrano v. Priest, in which the court held that education was a
fundamental interest and that substantial disparities in per-pupil
financing in California violated the Federal Equal Protection Clause
and its California equivalent.123 However, reformers quickly met a
roadblock to federal lawsuits on these issues in the U.S. Supreme
Court. This Part examines how federalism influenced the Supreme
Court's decision to foreclose federal school finance litigation. It then
analyzes research that considers whether state school finance
reform and litigation have been an effective alternative for ensuring
that all students receive equal educational opportunity.

Closing the Door to Federal School Finance Litigation
The Court ruled in its 1973 decision in San Antonio
Independent School District v. Rodriguez 124 that the Constitution did
not recognize education as a fundamental right and rejected

A.

121. See Adam Liptak, Justices Weigh Race as a Factor at Universities, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 11, 2012, at Al.
122. See Melissa C. Carr & Susan H. Fuhrman, The Politics of School
Finance in the 1990s, in EQUITY AND ADEQUACY IN EDUCATION FINANCE: ISSUES
AND PERSPECTIVES 136, 143 (Helen F. Ladd et al. eds., 1999).
123. Serrano v. Priest (Serrano I), 487 P.2d 1241, 1244, 1249 n.ll (Cal.
1971); Serrano v. Priest (Serrano II), 557 P.2d 929, 957-58 (Cal. 1976); see also
Carr & Fuhrman, supra note 122.
124. 411 u.s. 1 (1973).
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plaintiffs' arguments that the Texas school financing scheme
discriminated on the basis of wealth.125 Mexican American parents
of children in schools in the Edgewood Independent School District,
a city school district in San Antonio, Texas, sued the state on behalf
of minority schoolchildren and those poor children who lived in
districts with a relatively low base for property taxes.1 26 The
plaintiffs alleged that the Texas school finance system discriminated
against a suspect class and infringed upon education as a
fundamental rightJ27 They emphasized the wide disparities in perpupil spending throughout the state.12s The federal district court
held that the Texas system for financing schools violated the
Federal Equal Protection Clause because it discriminated on the
basis of wealth by allowing wealthier districts to provide a higherquality education while paying lower taxes than less affluent
districtsJ29 The lower court found that although Texas claimed that
the system promoted local control and the ability of parents to
determine how much to spend on their child's education, in reality
"the state has, in truth and in fact, limited the choice of financing by
guaranteeing that 'some districts will spend low (with high taxes)
while others will spend high (with low taxes)."'130
The Supreme Court reversed and held that the Texas scheme
neither discriminated on the basis of wealth nor infringed upon a
fundamental right. 131 The Court rejected the wealth discrimination
claim because the class, according to the Court, was not clearly
defined, nor did the class bear the hallmarks of a suspect class, such
as a history of past discrimination or a lack of political power. 132
The Court further held that the Constitution neither explicitly nor
implicitly protected education as a fundamental right and that the
importance of education could not render it a fundamental right. 133
Even though an education is necessary to exercise the right to speak
and to vote, the Court noted that the Constitution did not guarantee

125. See id. at 6, 18-19, 28, 35.
126. !d. at 4-5.
127. See id. at 17.
128. See id. at 15. For instance, the Edgewood Independent School District
adopted the highest tax rate in the San Antonio area but, given its low property
value, was only able to raise $26 per pupil and to spend a total of $356 per pupil
when state and federal funds were added to the local contribution. See id. at
12. In contrast, Alamo Heights, the most property-rich district in San Antonio,
raised $333 per pupil with a lower tax rate and spent a total of $594 per pupil.
See id. at 13.
129. See id. at 6; Rodriguez v. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 337 F. Supp.
280, 285 (W.D. Tex. 1971), rev'd, 411 U.S. 1.
130. Rodriguez, 337 F. Supp. at 284 (quoting Van Dusartz v. Hatfield, 334 F.
Supp. 870, 876 (D. Minn. 1971)).
131. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 6, 18-19, 28, 35.
132. !d. at 28.
133. Id. at 33, 35.
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that either right must be exercised to its fullest extent.t34
Furthermore, the plaintiffs had only alleged a relative deprivation of
educational opportunity and had failed to allege an absolute denial
of education or that the state had denied each child the chance to
obtain "the basic minimal skills necessary for the enjoyment of the
rights of speech and of full participation in the political process."t35
In the absence of a fundamental right, the Court reviewed the
disparities in educational opportunity under the rational basis
standard and found that the system rationally advanced local
control of education_136 The Court explained that in matters of tax
policy and education policy, it lacked the expertise to interfere with
state and local decisions_137
Given the debates about the
relationship between quality and school expenditures, the goals of
education, and the proper allocation of authority between state and
local governments, the Court noted that wisdom counseled against it
imposing constitutional requirements upon the states that could
hinder them from discovering possible solutions to the challenges
they confront when designing school funding systems.tas For these
reasons, the Court held that the Texas school funding system was
rationally related to a legitimate state interest in local control of
education. 139
Like the school desegregation cases, the Rodriguez Court relied
heavily on two interrelated education federalism interests when it
rejected the plaintiffs' claims: maintaining the existing balance of
power between the federal and state governments and ensuring
local control of schools.1 40 The Court indicated that it wanted to
maintain the existing balance of power when it noted that the
plaintiffs were essentially asking the Court to invalidate the school
finance systems in all flfty states. 141 In rejecting the plaintiffs'
claims, the Court acknowledged that, although all equal protection
claims implicate federalism, "it would be difficult to imagine a case
having a greater potential impact on our federal system than the
one now before us."l 42 The Court explained that its understanding
of the proper allocation of federal and state power also guided its
application of the rational basis standard to determine the
constitutionality of the existing school finance system.1 43
Furthermore, invalidating the property tax as a means of funding

134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

See id. at 36.
Id. at 37.
See id. at 40, 49-53.
See id. at 40-42.
Id. at 43.
See id. at 54-55.
See id. at 42-44, 49-50.
See id. at 47-48, 54-55.
Id. at 44.
See id.
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schools could implicate the funding of other public services that rely
on property taxes.144
The Court's opinion also emphasized the nation's long-standing
commitment to local control of education and the benefits that it
secures for education. According to the Court, local control of
education enables communities to create programs that are tailored
to the needs of their students.1 45 Like the relationship between the
federal government and the state, local control also provides "some
opportunity for experimentation, innovation, and a healthy
competition for educational excellence."146 In fact, the Court claimed
that no social issue could benefit more from a variety of viewpoints
and approaches than education.147 The Court further explained that
even though centralization of government represented a growing
trend, local oversight of schools has remained one of the hallmarks
of the American education system.148
The Court also reaffirmed the freedom of Texas residents to
choose a system that favored local control over greater equality. The
plaintiffs had acknowledged the numerous benefits of local control
but had contended that local control could be preserved while
simultaneously narrowing the disparities in educational opportunity
that pervaded the system.149 The Court responded that, under the
rational basis standard, Texas was not required to choose the least
restrictive approach to accomplish its goals.150 Instead, given the
many benefits of local control of education, the Court noted that
Texas residents might justifiably conclude that additional state
control over school finances would result in an undesirable increase
in state control over school decisions.151 The Court also noted its
unwillingness to claim that its assessment of the Texas system was
superior to that of the educators, scholars, and state lawmakers
throughout the nation.152 In reaching this conclusion, the Court
again chose to preserve education federalism at the expense of equal
educational opportunity.153
144. See id. at 54.
145. ld. at 50.
146. ld.
147. ld.
148. See id. at 49.
149. See id. at 50.
150. See id. at 50-51. In rejecting the plaintiffs' contention that the system
of financing schools should not depend upon the ''happenstance" of the amount
of taxable property in each district, the Court responded that all jurisdictional
boundaries in taxation schemes are arbitrary and that localities may influence
the amount of taxable property by attracting businesses to the locality. See id.
at 53-54.
151. !d. at 51-53.
152. ld. at 55.
153. See Liu, supra note 16, at 724 ("[I]n Rodriguez . .. deference to local
control led the Court to retreat from the imperative of equal educational
opportunity.").
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In privileging the interests of federalism over equal educational
opportunity, the Court insulated inequitable disparities in
educational opportunity from federal judicial oversight. Instead of
considering how these disparities could be addressed, the Court
treated these disparities, "however avoidable and 'unjust,' as
nothing more than an unfortunate and unactionable byproduct of
the 'vital national tradition' of local control." 154 This approach fails
to account for the vital national interest in equal educational
opportunity that the Court recognized in Brown [.155
Furthermore, as occurred in the school desegregation decisions,
the Rodriguez Court's insistence on the primacy of state and local
control of education paints a dualist portrait of education law and
policy that did not exist when the Court decided the case.l56 This
dualist portrait fails to protect individual rights and to understand
the importance of a federal role in ensuring equal educational
opportunity that is evidenced in Brown I, the ESEA, and other
federal laws requiring equal educational opportunity.l57 The five-tofour vote in the case signifies that the dissenting Justices did not
share this dualist understanding of education federalism. Instead,
the four dissenting Justices concluded that the Texas system did not
provide local control to those districts with a low property tax base
because "no matter how desirous parents are of supporting their
schools with greater revenues, it is impossible to do so through the
use of the real estate property tax" given the value of the property
within those districts and the state law limits on the tax rate.l5B
Therefore, the Texas funding scheme failed to satisfy the rational
basis standard.l59 In fact, the dissenting Justices concluded that the
majority made its equal protection analysis into nothing "more than
an empty gesture" because it failed to require Texas to establish how
the approach it adopted was rationally related to the goal of local
contro}.l60 Numerous scholars agree with the dissenting Justices
and contend that Rodriguez was wrongly decided.l61
154. Id. at 727 (footnote omitted).
155. See Brown v. Bd. ofEduc. (Brown I), 347 U.S 483,493 (1954).
156. See MANNA, COLLISION COURSE, supra note 3, at 5; SCHAPIRO, supra note
21.
157. See supra text accompanying notes 99-103; see also MANNA, CoLLISION
COURSE, supra note 3, at 5 ("Since the 1960s, developments in federal
[education] policy have reflected this equity theme.").
158. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 64-67 (1973)
(White, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
159. See id. at 67-68.
160. See id.
161. See, e.g., CHEMERINSKY, supra note 16 ("The Court held that there is no
constitutional right to education and thus that differentials in spending
between wealthy and poor school districts within a metropolitan area are
constitutionally permissible. If I were to list the most important, and the worst,
Supreme Court decisions during my lifetime, Rodriguez would be high on this
list."); Thomas Kleven, The Democratic Right to Full Bilingual Education, 7
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Scholars also raise substantial arguments that Rodriguez no
longer remains applicable law. Since the Court decided Rodriguez,
scholars have noted that even if one agrees with the
characterization of the importance of local control that the Court
trumpets in the decision, local control of education no longer
remains the prevalent approach to education federalism within the
United States,162 Instead, numerous scholars have noted the
growing centralization of education at the state and federal levels
beginning in the 1980s and through NCLBJ63 Although states only
provided a small share of education budgets when Rodriguez was
decided, states now serve as the primary funders of education.164
Education law scholar Derek Black also has persuasively
demonstrated that the federalism concerns that limited the Court's
decision in Rodriguez would no longer limit the Court's actions
today,I65 He further argued that states have already created rights
to education that would enable the Court to find that the Equal
Protection Clause demands that the states implement their
education laws to ensure that districts possess the essential
educational resources that they require to provide state-defined
rights to education,166
Some also have suggested that the need to preserve local
control, particularly suburban local control, has been used by the
Supreme Court as an excuse for limiting school desegregation and
school finance reform,l67 This suggests that education federalism
may simply have been a shield that the Court hid behind when it
lacked the will to interpret federal law in a way that would ensure
that students enjoyed the equal educational opportunity that Brown

NEV. L.J. 933, 939 (2007); David A.J. Richards, Equal Opportunity and School
Financing: Towards a Moral Theory of Constitutional Adjudication, 41 U. CHI.
L. REV. 32, 70 (1973) ("If one believes in principled and reasoned constitutional
adjudication, Rodriguez must be disappointing, for it is not supported by sound
constitutional principles or moral or legal reasoning. The majority could not
have reached this decision had it given precise thought to the nature and
weight of the moral concept of equal opportunity."). But see Jeffrey S. Sutton,
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez and Its Aftermath, 94 VA.
L. REV. 1963, 1977-78 (2008) (arguing that Rodriguez led to school funding
reform at the state level).
162. See Black, supra note 10, at 1405-06; Michael Heise, The Political
Economy of Education Federalism, 56 EMORY L.J. 125, 131 (2006); James E.
Ryan, The Tenth Amendment and Other Paper Tigers: The Legal Boundaries of
Education Governance, in WHO'S IN CHARGE HERE?: THE TANGLED WEB OF
SCHOOL GOVERNANCE AND POLICY 42, 60 (Noel Epstein ed., 2004).
163. See Black, supra note 10, at 1402-03; Heise, supra note 162; Liu, supra
note 16, at 730-31; Ryan, supra note 162.
164. See Black, supra note 10, at 1403.
165. Id. at 1395-1406.
166. See id. at 1405-06.
167. RYAN, supra note 7, at 212; see also Liu, supra note 16, at 726.
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I proclaimed was their right.I68 As noted in Part LA, proving or
disproving the genuineness of the Court's rationale can be quite
difficult, although some believe that Parents Involved provides
substantial evidence that, in the context of school desegregation, the
strong preference for local control was not as genuine as the Court
professed in earlier cases.169
Yet, if one gives credence to the authenticity of the Court's
rationales in these cases, one also can identify several reasons why
the Court might genuinely deflect an invitation to uphold remedies
that would overturn, or at least significantly alter, the American
tradition of state and local control over schools and limited federal
power in this arena. First, the Court might honestly believe that it
simply is not the institution to decide whether this tradition should
continue given its lack of expertise on education issues and its
undemocratic nature_l70 Instead, the Court might view the states,
or even Congress, as better suited to decide the continuing value of
this American tradition. Second, the Court in Rodriguez might have
found the split of opinion on pivotal education policy issues-such as
whether additional resources would improve student outcomes-as
sufficient reason to stay its hand.171 Finally, the Court may have
believed that it lacked the capacity and resources to accept federal
oversight of school desegregation and the nation's school finance
systems in perpetuity.
Undoubtedly, a Court that privileged equal educational
opportunity over these other competing values could have overcome
each of these obstacles. Indeed, numerous scholars have argued
that the Court should have decided the school desegregation cases
and Rodriguez differently,172 and I find many of their arguments

168. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown 1), 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
169. See Suzanne Eckes, Public School Integration and the 'Cruel Irony' of
the Decision in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School
District No. 1, 229 EDUC. L. REP. 1, 14 (2008); Daniel P. Tokaji, Desegregation,
Discrimination and Democracy: Parents Involved's Disregard for Process, 69
OHIO ST. L.J. 847, 861-62 (2008).
170. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 58 (1973);
Jesse H. Choper, The Supreme Court and the Political Branches, 122 U. PA. L.
REV. 810, 811 (1974) (noting that the Supreme Court and federal judges "appear
to be wholly without political responsibility'').
171. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 56--58.
172. For arguments that the Supreme Court reached the wrong decision in
Rodriguez, see Chemerinsky, supra note 18, at 121 ("The Court had the
opportunity to remedy this inequality in education in [Rodriguez] ... [b]ut the
court profoundly failed."); Ian Millhiser, What Happens to a Dream Deferred?:
Cleansing the Taint of San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez,
55 DUKE L.J. 405, 418 (2005). For scholars who have argued that the school
desegregation decisions were wrongly decided, see Millhisen, supra, at 421-22.
at 421-22; Bradley W. Joondeph, Killing Brown Softly: The Subtle
Undermining of Effective Desegregation in Freeman v. Pitts, 46 STAN. L. REV.
147, 157 (1993); J. John Harris et al., The Curious Case of Missouri v. Jenkins:
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quite compelling. Given the fact that the Court has shown no signs
of reversing its decisions in these areas, I believe that a viable
alternative to demanding that the Court restructure education
federalism lies in inviting the nation to reexamine its understanding
of education federalism and insisting on an understanding that
supports and even demands equal educational opportunity. I
propose such an understanding of education federalism in a future
work.173
The Court in Rodriguez intentionally deferred the questions
raised by disparities in school finance systems to the states174 but
simultaneously acknowledged the need for reform. The Court called
for reform of school finance systems in stating:
The need is apparent for reform in tax systems which may well
have relied too long and too heavily on the local property tax.
And certainly innovative thinking as to public education, its
methods, and its funding is necessary to assure both a higher
level of quality and greater uniformity of opportunity.175
The Court expressly noted the need for innovation to ensure
that public education and its funding schemes provide improved
quality and greater equality of educational opportunity. Therefore,
Rodriguez leaves those seeking equal educational opportunity
through school finance systems to the patchwork of state remedies
to address these disparities. The next Subpart reveals that in some
states these remedies have helped to reduce disparities in
educational opportunity, but they have proved inadequate at
systematically ensuring equal educational opportunity throughout
the nation.

B.

The Limitations of State School Finance Litigation and Reform
In rejecting the plaintiffs' challenges to school finance
disparities, the Supreme Court in Rodriguez opined that state and
local governments should be the entities to undertake revisions to
school finance systems that promote equality of educational
opportunity.176 Since Rodriguez, most states have reformed their
school funding system in response to litigation or the threat of
litigation or at the initiation of the legislature.m However, research
reveals that, in spite of these efforts and some reduction in
disparities in educational opportunity in some states, school finance

The End of the Road for Court-Ordered Desegregation?, 66 J. NEGRO Enuc. 43,
44 (1997).
173. See Robinson, supra note 20.
174. See Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 58--59.
175. Id. at 58.
176. See id.
177. See Black, supra note 10, at 1360-65; Sutton, supra note 161, at 1971.
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systems continue to result in significant and inequitable disparities
in educational opportunity.178
Litigation reform efforts after Rodriguez have sought equity in
school finance under state equal protection or education clauses,
adequacy under state education clauses, or some combination
thereof.179 Equity claims oftentimes request reforms to school
finance systems that enable students to receive equal per-pupil
funding or the guaranteed opportunity to provide equal funding.1so
Adequacy claims seek sufficient funding to ensure that each child
obtains an education that offers a specified level of knowledge or
skills.lBl In spite of the different labels attached to each type of
claim, both claims typically seek greater equity in school funding as
their ultimate objective.1s2
When pursuing school finance litigation, many plaintiffs have
found the state courthouse doors closed to them by courts who
viewed the determination of school finance systems to be the sole
discretion of state legislatures. For instance, the Florida Supreme
Court rejected a school finance case because it would have required
the judiciary to invade the duties of the legislature.183 The Illinois
and Rhode Island Supreme Courts turned away school finance
plaintiffs for similar reasons.184 Research indicates that when
states prevail in school finance litigation they oftentimes reduce
state funding for education and thus leave locals to offset these
reductions .185
Generally, plaintiffs who primarily sought adequacy claims
have proven more successful than those bringing equity-focused
claims, although each type of claim has enjoyed success in some
states.186 More than half of the highest state courts have upheld

178. See THE EQUITY & EXCELLENCE COMM'N, supra note 9, at 17, 19; BRUCE
D. BAKER ET AL., EDUC. LAw CTR., Is SCHOOL FUNDING FAIR? A NATIONAL REPORT
CARD 26-27 (2d ed. 2012); Black, supra note 10, at 1370-71.
179. See RYAN, supra note 7, at 149 (challenging the typical scholarly
characterization of school finance as proceeding in three waves); Black, supra
note 10, at 1360-64 (describing three waves of school finance litigation).
180. See RYAN, supra note 7, at 149; see, e.g., Brigham v. State, 692 A.2d
384, 390 (Vt. 1997).
181. See RYAN, supra note 7, at 149; see, e.g., Rose v. Council for Better
Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212 (Ky. 1989).
182. See RYAN, supra note 7, at 150-51.
183. Coal. for Adequacy & Fairness in Sch. Funding v. Chiles, 680 So. 2d
400, 408 (Fla. 1996).
184. See Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1189 (Ill. 1996);
City of Pawtucket v. Sundlun, 662 A.2d 40, 58 (R.I. 1995); see also RYAN, supra
note 7, at 147-48 (noting that some scholars applaud such decisions).
185. Christopher Berry, The Impact of School Finance Judgments on State
Fiscal Policy, in SCHOOL MONEY TRIALS: THE LEGAL PURSUIT OF EDUCATIONAL
ADEQUACY 213, 233 (Martin R. West & Paul E. Peterson eds., 2007).
186. See Black, supra note 10, 1362-65.
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plaintiffs' claims challenging school finance systems,187
For
instance, the California Supreme Court struck down its school
finance system first under the Federal Equal Protection Clause 188
and, after Rodriguez, under the state equal protection clause, 189
noting that the local control of school funding that the state sought
to promote represented "a cruel illusion for the poor school
districts." 190 The New Jersey Supreme Court held that inequities in
its funding system violated the state education clause that
guaranteed a "thorough and efficient" education,19 1 The Kentucky
Supreme Court's ruling for the plaintiffs identified the knowledge
and skills that students must possess upon leaving the school
system and required the legislature to establish a system that
accomplished that result,192 The New Hampshire Supreme Court
defined an adequate education based upon students' roles in
societyJ93
In response to successful litigation-or sometimes merely the
threat of litigation-some states have reformed their school finance
systems, including reforms in numerous states that provide
additional aid to low-income students, students with special needs,
and English language learners.l94 For instance, New Jersey stands
out as a state in which litigation and political mobilization have led
to some of the most progressive reforms to its education system. In
response to more than a dozen court decisions insisting that the
legislature make changes, the New Jersey legislature redistributed
large amounts of state aid to poor urban school systems, including
approximately $3.5 to $4 billion in basic education aid that these
districts otherwise would not have receivedJ95 The Kentucky school
finance litigation, along with a concurrent political strategy, led to
an overhaul of the Kentucky education system, an increase in
revenue for education from both state and local sources, and a

187. See id. at 1397.
188. Serrano v. Priest (Serrano I), 487 P.2d 1241,1244 (Cal. 1971).
189. Serrano v. Priest (Serrano II), 557 P.2d 929, 957-58 (Cal. 1976).
190. Serrano I, 487 P.2d at 1260.
191. Robinson v. Cahill, 303 A.2d 273, 295 (N.J. 1973).
192. Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 212-13 (Ky.
1989).
193. Claremont Sch. Dist. v. Governor, 635 A.2d 1375, 1381 (N.H. 1993).
194. See DAVID HURST ET AL., NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, OVERVIEW
AND INVENTORY OF STATE EDUCATION REFORMS: 1990 TO 2000, at 40 (2003),
available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2003/2003020.pdf; Sean P. Corcoran &
William N. Evans, Equity, Adequacy and the Evolving State Role in Education
Finance, in HANDBOOK OF RESEARCH IN EDUCATION FINANCE AND POLICY 332, 334
(Helen F. Ladd & Edward B. Fiske eds., 2008); Robinson, supra note 19, at
1670; Deborah A. Verstegen & Teresa S. Jordan, A Fifty-State Survey of School
Finance Policies and Programs: An Overview, 34 J. EDUC. FIN. 213, 224 (2009).
195. See MICHAEL PARIS, FRAMING EQUAL OPPORTUNITY: LAW AND THE
POLITICS OF SCHOOL FINANCE REFORM 147 (2010); RYAN, supra note 7, at 172.
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substantial reduction of the spending disparity between poor and
rich districts.l96
Overall, most research indicates that school finance litigation
has resulted in additional funding for education, particularly for
poor districts, and has reduced inequities in funding schools.l9 7 In
addition, a study of school finance inequality from 1972 to 2002
found that decreases in inequality in school finance have followed
periods of court activity while inequality rose or remained steady
during periods of relative inactivity. 198 Although most, but not all,
studies generally agree that litigation has had a positive impact on
education finance by raising educational spending and reducing
interdistrict spending disparities, 199 the studies disagree over the
impact and influence of this litigation. For instance, one study
found a nineteen to thirty-four percent reduction in intrastate
spending disparities,2oo while another more recent study found it to
be sixteen percent.2o1 The later study also found that litigation has
reduced inequities in spending, but that the net effect has often been
quite limited because state spending increases are often offset by
decreases at the local level.202 One promising trend is that states
have begun to provide additional funding for students with
additional needs, such as low-income students and special education
students.203 Although the size of the reduction in spending

196. See PARIS, supra note 195, at 7-9.
197. See HURST ET AL., supra note 194, at 47; MICHAEL A. REBELL, COURTS
AND KIDS: PURSUING EDUCATIONAL EQUITY THROUGH THE STATE COURTS 30-31
(2009) (''Virtually all of these studies have concluded that the litigations have
resulted in a narrowing of interdistrict expenditure disparities and an increase
in educational spending."); KIM REUBEN & SHEILA MURRAY, RACIAL DISPARITIES
IN EDUCATION FINANCE: GOING BEYOND EQUAL REVENUES 4-5 (2008), available at
http://www. taxpolicycenter .org/UploadedPD F/411785_equal_revenues. pdf;
David Card & A. Abigail Payne, School Finance Reform, the Distribution of
School Spending, and the Distribution of Student Test Scores, 83 J. PUB. EcoN.
49, 67 (2002).
198. See REUBEN & MURRAY, supra note 197, at 4.
199. REBELL, supra note 197, at 31. But see Berry, supra note 185, at 214 ("In
contrast to much of the rhetoric about the revolutionary impact of school
finance judgments, I find that they have had relatively small or no effects on
most school finance outcomes. On a variety of fiscal measures, ranging from
total spending to spending inequality, I find substantively small or statistically
insignificant effects of school finance judgments. The most important effect,
according to this analysis, has been to accelerate the centralization of school
funding to the state level.").
200. Sheila E. Murray et al., Education-Finance Reform and the Distribution
of Education Resources, 88 AM. EcoN. REV. 789, 806 (1998).
201. Berry, supra note 185, at 233.
202. Id. at 223.
203. See Verstegen & Jordan, supra note 194; Martin R. West & Paul E.
Peterson, The Adequacy Lawsuit: A Critical Appraisal, in SCHOOL MONEY
TRIALS: THE LEGAL PURSUIT OF EDUCATIONAL ADEQUACY, supra note 185, at 1, 910.
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disparities remains unclear, some school finance systems
undoubtedly have become more equitable than they were when
Rodriguez was decided.
Nevertheless, scholars also have noted that these reforms
should not be overstated.204 The legislative response to school
finance litigation in most states has been described as "fairly tepid,"
and minority school districts were less likely to prevail and faced
extremely hostile legislatures when they did prev·ail.205 Despite
several decades of school finance reform, many school finance
systems have remained quite resistant to lasting and comprehensive
reform.2os
One persistent source of disparities in financing
education remains the property tax,207 an approach that the Court
in Rodriguez suggested may have been used for too long.2os A recent
analysis of the current reliance on property taxes reveals that forty
states use a foundation program, and five use a combination
approach that typically includes a foundation component.209 The
foundation approach combines a contribution from local
governments that is typically raised through property taxes as well
as state funding that seeks to make up the difference between the
revenue raised by wealthy and poorer localities.21o However, this
approach permits inequalities in funding to remain because
"[u]sually localities can 'go beyond' the state guaranteed amount
with additional property taxes that are unmatched by the state."211
Research indicates that between the 1998-99 school year and the
2008-09 school year, local property taxes consistently accounted for
approximately thirty-five percent of funding for schools.212
A 2013 report from President Obama's Commission on Equity
and Excellence ("the Commission") provides some of the most recent
research on the nature and extent of inequitable school finance

204. See BENJAMIN MICHAEL SUPERFINE, THE CoURTS AND STANDARDS-BASED
EDUCATION REFORM 123 (2008).
205. RYAN, supra note 7, at 171-72.
206. See DOUGLAS S. REED, ON EQUAL TERMS: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS
OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY 16 (2001) ("[T]hese reductions in the level of
inequality have not substantially altered the institutional contexts of
educational finance."); RYAN, supra note 7, at 153.
207. See RYAN, supra note 7, at 153 ("[S]chool funding systems in just about
every state continue to be unequal and strongly influenced by differing levels of
property wealth.").
208. See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 58 (1973).
209. Verstegen & Jordan, supra note 194, at 215 & tbl.l.
210. Id. at 215.
211. Id.
212. SUSAN AUD ET AL., NAT'L CTR. FOR EDUC. STATISTICS, THE CONDITION OF
EDUCATION 2012, at 192 tbl.A-19-1 (2012), available at http://nces.ed.gov
/programs/coe/pdffcoe_sft.pdf. This research also reveals that states vary in
their reliance on property taxes from lows of zero percent or close to zero
percent in Hawaii and Vermont to highs of fifty-five percent in New Hampshire
and Connecticut. Id. at 54.
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disparities within the United States that remain even after
numerous state efforts to reform school finance systems. President
Obama created the Commission to study disparities in educational
opportunity and emphasized the need to focus on school finance
systems and to recommend how the federal government could assist
in remedying these disparities.213 The Commission brought together
many of the nation's leading experts on education finance and
reform as well as business leaders and many of the nonprofit
organizations that consistently work on issues of equity in
education.214 In a February 2013 report, the Commission found that
deeply entrenched inequities remain in the nation's school finance
systems despite a finding by a federal commission in 1972 that the
inequities and inadequacies in the nation's school finance systems
were caused by outdated school finance formulas that depended too
heavily on property taxes.215 The report acknowledged that many
states have decreased their reliance on property taxes and have
used the increased reliance on state funding to increase equity.216
However, the report noted that despite four decades of reforms by
federal, state, and local governments these reforms have failed to
create equitable and adequate school finance systems.2 17 Indeed,
the Commission summarized its finding that these reforms have
fallen short by stating that:
These initiatives have not addressed the fundamental sources
of inequities and so have not generated the educational gains
desired.
Despite these efforts and proclamations, large
achievement gaps remain, and local finance and governance
systems continue to allow for, and in many ways encourage,
inequitable and inadequate funding systems and inefficient
and ineffective resource utilization.218
The report further condemned school finance systems, with only
limited exceptions, for failing to link school finance systems to the
cost of ensuring that all students achieve high standards.2 19 The
report also confirmed that the nation's education system continues
to confine poor and minority communities to the poorest-performing
teachers, poorly maintained facilities, and inferior academic

213. See U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., CHARTER OF THE EQUITY AND EXCELLENCE
COMMISSION 1 (2011), available at http://www2.ed.gov/aboutlbdscomm/list/eec
/documents.html.
214. U.S. Secretary of Education Appoints Members of Equity and Excellence
Commission, U.S. DEP'T Eouc. (Feb. 17, 2011), http://www.ed.gov/news/press
-releases/us-secretary-education-appoints-members-equity-and-excellence
·COmmlSSlOn.
215. THE EQUITY & EXCELLENCE COMM'N, supra note 9, at 17.
216. See id.
217. See id. at 19.
218. See id. (emphasis added).
219. See id. at 17.
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opportunities and expectations.22o In light of this unequivocal
condemnation of the nation's school finance systems, the report
recommended a variety of reforms by the states and the federal
government that would restructure school finance systems to
provide for an efficient distribution of adequate resources that are
allocated based upon students' needs and that would enable all
students to achieve high standards.221
Other research also confirms that many school finance systems
within the United States fail to provide an adequate and equitable
distribution of education funding. For instance, a 2012 report
entitled Is School Funding Fair? A National Report Card assessed
the school finance systems of all fifty states against four fairness
measures: (1) funding level-the level of state and local funding for
school districts compared to that of other states; (2) funding
distribution-whether a state provides additional funding or reduces
funding to schools based on the concentration of student poverty; (3)
effort-which compares the difference between state spending on
education relative to the fiscal capacity of the state based on its per
capita gross domestic product; and (4) coverage-the percentage of
students in the state who attend public schools.222 The resulting
analysis provides a multifaceted and comprehensive assessment of
the school finance systems throughout the nation that stands in
contrast to many studies that simply use one measure of inequality.
Several key findings highlight existing inequities in school
finance systems. The report notes that states have the most control
over two factors-funding distribution and effort.223 In particular,
funding distribution provides the greatest insight into whether
states attempt to address the additional educational needs of lowincome students.22 4 On this measure, "[o]nly 17 states have
progressive funding systems, providing greater funding to highpoverty districts than to low-poverty districts," which represents an
increase from the fourteen states that were progressive in the 2010
report.225 Sixteen states have regressive systems that give less
money to high-poverty districts, and fifteen states provide the same

220. See id. at 14.
221. See id. at 17-20.
222. BAKER ET AL., supra note 178, at 6-7. The authors are scholars of school
finance, and David Sciarra, one of the nation's leading school finance attorneys,
litigated the New Jersey school finance litigation.
223. Id. at 10.
224. See id. at 13, 14 & tbl.3.
225. Id. at 13. These states are California, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia,
Indiana, Kentucky, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, New
Jersey, New Mexico, Ohio, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, and Wyoming. Id.
at 15 fig.3. Hawaii is omitted from the analysis because it is a single district
and Alaska is omitted because the state's parse population and geography
created inconsistent measures of funding distribution under the model used in
the study. See id. at 13.
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level of funding to high- and low-poverty districts.226 This reveals
that only slightly more than one-third of the school finance systems
are sending additional revenue to address the well-documented
greater needs of low-income students.227 The report also notes that
between 2007 and 2009, thirty-four states increased their effort, but
that states varied widely in the effort made to fairly fund schools.22s
The report further highlights the importance of both sufficient and
progressive funding systems as an indispensable foundation for
raising student achievement and closing the achievement gaps.229
Ultimately, this research reveals that, although important
reforms have undoubtedly occurred and have improved educational
opportunities for many children, these reforms have not been
consistently sufficient and comprehensive enough to end
longstanding, inequitable disparities in educational opportunity
throughout the nation.
Numerous scholars have noted the
insufficiency of these reforms.230 For instance, after surveying the
research on the impact of school finance litigation, education law
scholar Derek Black concluded that "[t]he most accurate general
characterization of adequacy and equity litigation ... is that it has
produced a net benefit, but significant and troublesome inequalities
Similarly, education law and policy scholar
still persist."23l
Benjamin Michael Superfine has characterized the impact of school
finance litigation as "somewhat limited" due to the longstanding
challenges facing education litigation generally, including vague
legal standards, empirical questions about central issues, and
political hostility to reform.232 Further, he notes that equalization
226. Id. at 13. The regressive states are Alabama, Colorado, Florida, Idaho,
Illinois, Maine, Michigan, Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, New York, North
Carolina, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Virginia. Id. at 15 fig.3.
The states that provide essentially level funding between low- and high-poverty
districts are Arizona, Arkansas, Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland,
Mississippi, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Vermont,
Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. ld.
227. See id. at 13.
228. Id. at 23.
229. Id. at 28.
230. See, e.g., William J. Glenn, School Finance Adequacy Litigation and
Student Achievement: A Longitudinal Analysis, 34 J. Eouc. FIN. 247, 262-63
(2009) (finding that adequacy litigation has a small positive effect on the
achievement of students from very low socioeconomic backgrounds and that
such reform should be included in overall comprehensive school reform);
Christopher Roellke et al., School Finance Litigation: The Promises and
Limitations of the Third Wave, 79 PEABODY J. Eouc. 104, 105 (2004) ("Despite
intensified school finance litigation and legislation over the past several
decades, school systems in the United States continue their struggle to operate
equitably and adequately. The evidence is clear that these goals of equity and
adequacy have been particularly elusive for schools attended primarily by lowincome and minority children.").
231. Black, supra note 10, at 1371 (footnotes omitted).
232. SUPERFINE, supra note 204.
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oftentimes did not require increased educational spending and that
test scores ultimately have not improved even when spending was
increased.233 Indeed, the resistance of most school finance systems
to comprehensive reform prompted leading education law scholar
James Ryan to comment recently that even when state school
finance litigation has succeeded, the results have been "modest" and
"not a single suit has done much to alter the basic structure of
school finance schemes."234 Therefore, important reforms of state
school finance systems have occurred that have addressed some of
the disparities in educational opportunity, but these reforms have
not ended the funding inequities that result in substandard schools
for many disadvantaged schoolchildren.235
Even though the Court in Rodriguez called for reform of the
nation's school finance systems to advance equal educational
opportunity,236 the local control of education that was supposed to
encourage experimentation simply has failed to foster
comprehensive and effective state efforts that eliminate inequitable
disparities in educational opportunity. Although some contend that
such experimentation and reform suggests the Court in Rodriguez
correctly left this issue to the states,237 the steadfast persistence in
disparities in educational opportunity that harm disadvantaged
students indicates the Court's trust in states to end these disparities
may have been misplaced. Therefore, closing the federal courthouse
door to school finance litigation has left disadvantaged
schoolchildren without a means to obtain comprehensive and lasting
reform of school finance systems that continue to tolerate significant
and inequitable disparities in educational opportunity. Given the
limited impact of state school finance litigation and reform,
Rodriguez remains essential to understanding how education
federalism has served as one of the hindrances to the nation's efforts
to achieve equal educational opportunity.
The next Part shows how education federalism limited the
potential effectiveness of NCLB.
Ill. EDUCATION FEDERALISM AND THE NO CHILD LEFT BEHIND ACT
OF 2001
The No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 represents the most farreaching federal legislative effort to advance educational equity and

233.
234.
235.
236.
{1973).
237.

Id. at 123-24.
RYAN, supra note 7, at 153.
See id. at 153-54, 178; Black, supra note 156, at 1357, 1371.
See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 50-51
See, e.g., Sutton, supra note 161.
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excellence in the nation's history.2ss The founding legislation for
NCLB, the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965,239
focused on providing additional resources to disadvantaged students
to attempt to bridge the opportunity gap between these students
and their more affluent peers.240 Subsequent reauthorizations built
upon this focus on low-income students while also expanding federal
assistance to particular populations of students, such as English
language learners.241 This federal legislation eventually embraced
the standards and accountability movement by requiring states to
adopt the same rigorous academic standards for all students
through the Improving America's Schools Act of 1994.242 NCLB is a
bipartisan congressional attempt to begin to close both the
achievement gap and the opportunity gap. 243 It substantially
expanded and restructured the federal role in elementary and
secondary education and, in doing so, ultimately shaped a new
education federalism.244
However, even as NCLB was reshaping education federalism,
education federalism handicapped NCLB's ability to effectively
address the achievement and opportunity gaps. This Part analyzes
how education federalism hindered two key NCLB provisions: the
requirement that all states adopt challenging academic standards
and the requirement that all classrooms have a highly qualified
teacher. This analysis reveals that even the most far-reaching
federal effort to promote equity and excellence in education could
not escape the policymaking constraints of education federalism.

238. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 20 U.S.C.); see MCGUINN, supra
note 3, at 1.
239. Pub. L. No. 89-10, 79 Stat. 27.
240. See MCGUINN, supra note 3, at 1, 31.
241. See MANNA, COLLISION COURSE, supra note 3, at 5.
242. Pub. L. No. 103-382, §§ 1111-1112, 108 Stat. 3518, 3523-32; see
MANNA, COLLISION COURSE, supra note 3, at 6.
243. See No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat.
1425 (noting that NCLB seeks "[t]o close the achievement gap with
accountability, flexibility, and choice, so that no child is left behind"); 20 U.S.C.
§ 6301 (2006) (noting that NCLB seeks "to ensure that all children have a fair,
equal, and significant opportunity to obtain a high-quality education and reach,
at a minimum, proficiency on challenging state academic achievement
standards and state academic assessments"); MANNA, COLLISION CoURSE, supra
note 3, at 22-23; McGUINN, supra note 3, at 175-76.
244. See McGUINN, supra note 3, at 1, 195. But see Lorraine M. McDonnell,
No Child Left Behind and the Federal Role in Education: Evolution or
Revolution?, 80 PEABODY J. Enuc. 19, 19-21 (2005) (arguing that NCLB
represents the continuing evolution of past federal education policy rather than
a revolution in the federal role in education).
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A. How Education Federalism Influenced the Requirements for
Challenging Academic Standards in NCLB
To understand how education federalism limited NCLB's
potential effectiveness, it is important to understand the key
components of NCLB.
NCLB requires all states to adopt
"challenging" academic standards at a minimum in math, reading,
and science that are applied to all students.245 Students must be
tested on their knowledge of these standards annually in grades
three through eight and once in grades ten through twelve in
reading and math beginning in the 2005-06 school year.246
Beginning in the 2007-08 school year, science testing must be
conducted once in each of three grade spans: grades three to five,
grades six to nine, and grades ten to twelve.247 States also must
define cut scores that determine when students are proficient on
state tests, and those scores must be separately reported for student
subgroups, including separate scores for racial and ethnic minority
students and low-income students.248 NCLB requires all schools and
districts to publish annual report cards detailing graduation rates,
school performance, and whether students and subgroups of
students are making adequate yearly progress ("AYP") toward the
goal of proficiency for all students by 2014.2 49 NCLB also imposes
accountability requirements on schools and districts that receive
funding under Title J.250 These requirements generally impose
increasingly interventionist corrective action each year that a school
or a subgroup within a school did not achieve proficiency on state
tests. 251
Despite
these
reformist
requirements,
the
current
understanding of education federalism has handcuffed the most
progressive elements of NCLB. NCLB's requirement that all
students become proficient at "challenging'' academic standards lies
at the heart of its effort to close the achievement gap. However,
rather than propose rigorous common standards for all students, the
existing structure of education federalism led Congress to allow each

245. 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(l)(A)-(C).
246. Id. § 6311(b)(3)(A)-(C).
24 7. I d. § 63ll(b)(3)(C)(v)(II).
248. The subgroups for reporting NCLB scores are gender, major racial and
ethnic minority groups, economically disadvantaged students, English language
learners, and disabled students. See id. § 6311(b)(3)(A), (b)(3)(C)(xiii).
249. See id. § 631l(b)(2)(F), (c)(l), (h); see also MANNA, COLLISION COURSE,
supra note 3, at 24. If a school or a particular subgroup is not proficient, it
could show it made AYP if it satisfied a "safe harbor" requirement of
demonstrating substantial improvement for the school or subgroup. See id. at
25.
250. See 20 U.S.C. § 6316(b)(l)(A), (5), (7), (8).
251. See id.
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state to set its own academic standards.252 Indeed, as professor of
government Paul Manna has noted, "Long-standing political
concerns and views of American federalism, such as the tradition of
state and local control of curriculum and teaching, kept some
options such as federally developed standards and tests off the
negotiating table from the start."253 Furthermore, the statute
ensures that the Department of Education will not exert influence
over the content of the standards by specifically stating that "a State
shall not be required to submit such standards to the Secretary [of
Education]."254 Allowing states to set academic standards provides
states with an opportunity to establish rigorous academic standards
that would prepare students for success in postsecondary education,
employment, and their communities.255
Unfortunately for the nation's schoolchildren, and ultimately
the nation, the states did not embrace this opportunity. Instead,
many states used the flexibility within NCLB as an opportunity to
lower standards to those that were easily attainable to avoid the
penalties and the reforms that would be required if students did not
reach demanding standards.256 The weak standards eviscerated the
proficiency requirement and instead made proficiency mean very
little in many states.257 As a result, student proficiency on state
tests did not ensure that students were well prepared for the
workforce or college.258
Even though education federalism limited Congress's ability to
adopt a national standard, Congress tried to prevent states from
adopting low standards by requiring states to test a sample of
students on the National Assessment of Educational Progress
("NAEP"), a standardized achievement test on reading and math for
fourth and eighth graders.259
However, this check proved

252. See GARY WASSERMAN, POLITICS IN ACTION: CASES FROM THE FRONTLINES
OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 23 (Reid Hester ed., 2011).
253. MANNA, CoLLISION COURSE, supra note 3, at 41; see also Ryan, supra
note 162, at 53-54 (arguing that NCLB's exclusion of provisions conditioning
federal funds on such things as national standards or a national curriculum
demonstrates that Congress chose to limit its reach to recognize state and local
authority over education).
254. 20 U.S.C. § 6311(b)(1)(A).
255. See MANNA, COLLISION COURSE, supra note 3, at 152.
256. See id. at 47, 153, supra note 3, at 47, 153; WASSERMAN, supra note 252;
Paul E. Peterson & Carlos Xabel Lastra-Anad6n, State Standards Rise in
Reading, Fall in Math, Enuc. NEXT, Fall 2010, at 13-14, available at
http://educa tionnext.org/files/ednext_20 104_12. pdf.
257. See MANNA, COLLISION COURSE, supra note 3, at 153; Mike Johnston,

From Regulation to Results: Shifting American Education from Inputs to
Outcomes, 30 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 195, 197 (2011).
258. See WASSERMAN, supra note 253.
259. 20 U.S.C. § 631l(c)(2); Robinson, supra note 19, at 1680; Peterson &
Lastra-Anad6n, supra note 256, at 13.
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insufficient to the task. 260 Most states have adopted significantly
weaker standards than the NAEP standards.261 Indeed, one study
found that "[e]very state, for both reading and math (with the
exception of Massachusetts for math), deems more students
'proficient' on its own assessments than NAEP does."262 The NAEP
data also reveal that less than one-third of the students in the
United States are proficient in reading and that a similar
percentage of students are proficient in math.263
Although states continue to adjust their standards and many
have committed in the last few years to adopt common standards in
response to federal money offered under President Obama's Race to
the Top Initiative,264 this analysis reveals that the congressional
genuflect to education federalism eviscerated the heart of NCLB by
preventing Congress from establishing a meaningful floor for state
education standards. Without any limits on the rigor of state
standards, many states chose to adopt weak academic standards.
The next Subpart reveals that education federalism also limited the
effectiveness of NCLB's requirement that every classroom must
have a highly qualified teacher in districts that receive Title I funds.

260. Peterson & Lastra-Anad6n, supra note 256; Robinson, supra note 19, at
1680.
261. See Peterson & Lastra-Anad6n, supra note 256.
262. See id. at 14.
263. See id. at 16.
264. See id. at 14-16. The Obama Administration's Race to the Top program
provided federal incentives for states to adopt state-developed common
standards as one of the criterion for obtaining Race to the Top funds. See Race
to the Top Fund: Notice Inviting Applications for New Awards for Fiscal Year
(FY) 2010, 74 Fed. Reg. 59,836, 59,836 (Nov. 18, 2009). Nevertheless, Alaska,
Minnesota, Nebraska, Texas, and Virginia refused to adopt these standards
despite the large sums of federal funds that potentially could have been
obtained through this competitive process. In the States, COMMON CORE ST.
STANDARDS INITIATIVE (Feb. 15, 2013, 3:25 PM), http://www.corestandards.org
/in-the-states. In addition, the rigor of these standards and the future
implementation of common standards remain uncertain because substantial
criticisms of these standards have been raised, including concerns about the
potential for adopting weak standards and a lack of detail in the standards that
could render them ineffective at guiding curriculum. See Sean Cavanagh,
Resurgent Debate, Familiar Themes: Common-Standards Push Bares Unsettled
Issue, EDVC. WK., Jan. 14, 2010, at 5, 11. Also, even if the standards help to
increase the rigor of state standards, most states did not obtain Race to the Top
funds to assist in the development and implementation of these standards, so it
remains unclear how committed they will remain to implementing these
standards in a time of scarce economic resources for schools. In addition, it also
is unclear what "adoption" of these common standards will mean for each state
as the states are free to adopt, incorporate, or modify these standards as they
see fit. See id. at 5.
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B. Education Federalism and the Highly Qualified Teacher
Requirement for NCLB
Research establishes that urban schools with high
concentrations of low-income and minority students typically employ
less qualified, experienced, and effective teachers.265 To address this
disparity, NCLB sought to close this aspect of the opportunity gap
by requiring a highly qualified teacher in every classroom for core
academic subjects in districts that accept Title I funds.266 NCLB
defines a highly qualified teacher as one who holds a bachelor's
degree, possesses competence in the subject that she teaches, and,
obtains full state certification or passes a state licensing exam and
holds a license to teach.267 NCLB required states to ensure that
teachers in core subjects were highly qualified by the 2005-06 school
year.268 To show competence to teach, a new teaching applicant for
an elementary teaching position must pass a state exam in math,
reading, and writing.269 A new teaching applicant for a middle
school or high school position could show competence in one of three
ways: pass a state exam in the subjects he or she will teach; possess
a postsecondary major or the equivalent coursework or a graduate
degree in the teaching subject; or, obtain credentialing
demonstrating their knowledge.270 Veteran teachers could show
competency in the same way, but NCLB also gave veteran teachers
the option to show competence by demonstrating that they met a
state standard of evaluation. 271 The statute does not provide a
federal minimum for demonstrating mastery in a subject. 272
Congressional concerns regarding education federalism limited
the effectiveness of these provisions. To safeguard state control of
teacher licensure standards, Congress provided broad flexibility to
states in defining a highly qualified teacher by allowing state
licensure or certification and successful completion of a state test in
the relevant subject area to establish the definition of highly

265. See RYAN, supra note 7, at 173; see also Molly S. McUsic, The Future of
Brown v. Board of Education: Economic Integration of the Public Schools, 117
HARV. L. REV. 1334, 1351-52 (2004); Motoko Akiba et al., Teacher Quality,
Opportunity Gap, and National Achievement in 46 Countries, 36 Enuc.
RESEARCHER 369, 369-70 (2007); Linda Darling-Hammond & Barnett Berry,

Recruiting Teachers for the 21st Century: The Foundation for Educational
Equity, 68 J. NEGRO Enuc. 254, 256 (1999).
266. 20 U.S.C. §§ 6319(a), 631l(c)(1), (h) (2006). Core academic subjects are
math, science, reading or language arts, English, civics and government,
geography, history, the a:rts, economics, and foreign languages. ld. § 7801(11).
267. Id. § 7801(23)(A)-(C).
268. ld. § 6319(a)(2).
269. Id. § 7801(23)(B)(i)(Il).
270. Id. § 7801(23)(B)(ii).
271. Id. § 7801(23)(C)(i)-(ii).
272. Kathleen Porter-Magee, Teacher Quality, Controversy, and NCLB, 78
CLEARING HOUSE 26, 28 (2004).
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qualified. 273
Like the flexibility for student standards, this
flexibility enabled states to lower standards for teachers.274 In
response to this flexibility, "many states have developed low
standards for defining what constitutes" a highly qualified teacher,
particularly when they encountered implementation difficulties such
as teacher shortages and insufficient data and information to track
teacher qualifications.275 Indeed, although some contend that most
states adopted rigorous standards for new teacher certification,276
other scholars allege that states have used this flexibility to ensure
that definitions of quality impose "no additional burden on either
existing teachers or new entrants" because the definitions simply
replicate preexisting certification and licensing standards.277 This
enabled states to require only minimal competence278 and to identify
the largest number of highly qualified teachers while avoiding
significant repercussions for identifying substantial numbers of
teachers who do not meet the requirements for being highly
qualified.279 This research indicates that state efforts to adopt a
rigorous definition of a highly qualified teacher represent the
exception rather than the rule.2so
Undoubtedly, other federal action also undermined the
effectiveness of the highly qualified teacher requirements.2s1 For
instance, the federal government issued inconsistent guidance and
See 20 U.S. C. §7801{23); MANNA, COLLISION COURSE, supra note 3, at 30.
See MANNA, COLLISION COURSE, supra note 3, at 47.
SUPERFINE, supra note 204, at 52.
See, e.g., Regina R. Umpstead & Elizabeth Kirby, Reauthorization
Revisited: Framing the Recommendations for the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act's Reauthorization in Light of No Child Left Behind's
Implementation Challenges, 276 Enuc. L. REP. 1, 13 (2012) ("[M]ost states
developed rigorous requirements for new teacher certification ...."). But see
Kate Walsh, Through the Looking Glass: How NCLB's Promise Requires Facing
Some Hard Truths About Teacher Quality, 78 CLEARING HOUSE 22, 24 (2004)
273.
274.
275.
276.

{"The standards [for highly qualified teachers] ranged from reasonable attempts
to meet the spirit of the law to approaches that can best be described as
indifferent and, at times, even disdainful of what the law is trying to do.")
277. Eric A. Hanushek & Steven G. Rivkin, The Quality and Distribution of
Teachers Under the No Child Left Behind Act, 24 J. ECON. PERSP. 133, 135-36
{2010); see also Barnett Berry et al., The Search for Highly Qualified Teachers,
85 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 684, 686 (2004); Porter-Magee, supra note 272, at 29;
Benjamin Michael Superfine, Using the Courts to Influence the Implementation
of No Child Left Behind, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 779, 794 (2006).
278. Michael A. Rebell & Molly A. Hunter, 'Highly Qualified' Teachers:
Pretense or Legal Requirement?, 85 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 690, 692 {2004).
279. Porter-Magee, supra note 272.
280. Rebell & Hunter, supra note 278, at 693.
281. State implementation of the highly qualified teacher requirement also
contributed to the limited impact of this provision. For instance, states
distributed funding for teachers quite broadly to fund recruitment and training
for highly qualified teachers rather than channeling these funds to schools that
had failed to meet the highly qualified teacher mandates. SUPERFINE, supra
note 204, at 52 {2008).
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did not effectively enforce the requirements.2s2 In addition, the
federal government did not provide any support to states to help
ensure an adequate pool of qualified teachers.283 However, these
additional failures on the part of the federal government only
highlight that the statute needed a more rigorous definition of a
highly qualified teacher that would have curbed state tendencies to
lower standards when difficulties arose or additional federal
financial support was not forthcoming.
The flexibility within and the limitations on the highly qualified
teacher provision caused by education federalism are particularly
important because NCLB does not otherwise attempt to address the
substantial disparities in the opportunity to learn state
standards.284 Instead, NCLB requires all students to be proficient
by 2014 even though many low-income and minority students do not
receive the educational opportunities and resources that they would
need to reach this standard.285 Although the states undoubtedly
enjoy the freedom to eliminate these disparities in educational
opportunity, Subpart II.B establishes that so far the overwhelming
majority of states typically have chosen to tolerate these disparities
rather than eliminate them in systematic and sustained ways.286
NCLB also reflects federalism limits because it does not
establish a federal curriculum or a federal assessment system, and
it does not indicate how states should determine when a school is
failing.287
Even though Congress could have enacted such
provisions under the Spending Clause, these provisions were
omitted to preserve state and local authority over these aspects of
education.2ss However, the omission of some of these requirements
also prevented the law from moving the nation closer to challenging
academic standards and tests for all children as well as a
consistently demanding definition for when a school should be
labeled "failing."
In addition, congressional insistence that the states must define
standards for academics and for teachers reflects a somewhat
dualist understanding of some areas of education law and policy.
Even as NCLB restructured and greatly expanded the role of
education, the refusal to adopt a floor for state standards indicates
that Congress believed that these standards must remain the sole

282. See MANNA, COLLISION COURSE, supra note 3, at 55-57.
283. See Linda Darling·Hammond, From "Separate but Equal" to "No Child
Left Behind':· The Collision of New Standards and Old Inequalities, in MANY
CHILDREN LEFT BEHIND: How THE No CHILD LEFT BEHIND ACT IS DAMAGING OUR
CHILDREN AND OUR SCHOOLS 3, 29 (Deborah Meier & George Wood eds., 2004).
284. See REBELL & WOLFF, supra note 7.
285. See id.
286. See discussion supra Subpart II.B.
287. See Ryan, supra note 162, at 54.
288. See id.
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province of the states. Although this decision represents an
understandable compromise in a statute that expanded federal
authority over education greater than any past reauthorization of
the Elementary and Secondary Education Act, it is important to
recognize that it is this understanding of the state role in education
as the sole determinant of standards that served as one of the
principal weaknesses within the statute that undermined its
effectiveness.
This research and analysis reveals that education federalism
hindered NCLB's goals of reducing the achievement and opportunity
gaps.289 NCLB undoubtedly changed the federal-state balance of
power by expanding the federal role in education. However, the
congressional attempts to preserve aspects of the existing balance of
federal-state authority over education ultimately undermined
Congress's ability to adopt more effective provisions that could have
assisted NCLB's efforts to close the achievement and opportunity
gaps.
CONCLUSION

Undoubtedly, no one factor can explain the failure of decades of
school reform efforts. A variety of additional factors have hindered
these reforms, and the above analysis is not attempting to suggest
otherwise. Even with this essential caveat, it is important to
recognize the consistent ways that education federalism limited
several reforms as scholars, educators, and policy-makers attempt to
understand why the nation continues to provide substandard
educational opportunity to many students. This understanding will
provide a crucial foundation for building more effective and
comprehensive reforms in the future.
Furthermore, education federalism's past hindrance of efforts to
advance equal educational opportunity raises an important
question: does education federalism need to be restructured to allow
for effective federal efforts to ensure equal access to an excellent
education? This question is particularly relevant as scholars,
politicians, and advocacy groups are proposing a variety of
recommendations for the reauthorization of the Elementary and
Secondary Education Act.290 In a future work, I consider this timely

289. See MANNA, COLLISION COURSE, supra note 3, at 22-23.
290. See Elementary and Secondary Education Amendments Act of 2011, S.
1571, 112th Cong.; Elementary and Secondary Education Reauthorization Act
of 2011, S. 3578, !12th Cong.; THE COMM'N. ON No CHILD LEFT' BEHIND, BEYOND
NCLB: FuLFILLING THE PROMISE TO OUR NATION'S CHILDREN 161-69
(2007), available at http://www.aucd.org/docs/Aspen%20Commission%20on
%20NCLB.pdf; NAT'L EDUC. Ass'N, NEA'S LEGISLATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
REAUTHORIZATION OF THE ELEMENTARY AND SECONDARY EDUCATION ACT 1-21
(2010),
available at http://www.nea.org/assets/docs/HE/NEA_Legislative
_Specifications_on_ESEA_MAY2010.pdf;
NAT'L
ScH.
BDs.
Ass'N,
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question. In the meantime, it is important to acknowledge the
systematic ways that education federalism hampered past efforts to
ensure equal educational opportunity as the nation considers
adopting new efforts to achieve this vital national goal.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE REAUTHORIZATION OF THE ELEMENTARY AND
SECONDARY EDUCATION ACT 1-10 (2010), available at http://www.nsba.org
/Advocacy/Key-Issues/NCLB; Damon T. Hewitt, Reauthorize, Revise, and
Remember: Refocusing the No Child Left Behind Act to Fulfill Brown's Promise,
30 YALE L. & PoL'y REV. 169, 179-80, 186, 192, 194 (2011) ("[I]n order to be
maximally effective in [NCLB's] next attempt to realize the ESEA's goal of
equitable options for all children, policy makers must resist calls for a
downgraded federal role in public education."); Kamina Aliya Pinder, Federal
Demand and Local Choice: Safeguarding the Notion of Federalism in Education
Law and Policy, 39 J.L. & EDUC. 1, 19 (2010) ("The next iteration of the ESEA
should minimize the federal role in enforcing state benchmarks ....");
Umpstead & Kirby, supra note 276, at 19-24 (2012) ("In an effort to redirect the
prevailing problems in NCLB and to provide recommendations from those that
understand schooling best, national education organizations have created
position
statements
regarding ESEA reauthorization
that
make
recommendations about how to best address academic achievement, the
instructional program, teacher quality, and other pressing issues."); Sam Dillon,
Obama Cails for Major Change in Education Law, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2010, at
A1 ("Administration officials laid out their blueprint in briefings Friday and
Saturday with governors, lawmakers, education organizations and journalists.
Officials said they intended to leave the drafting of a bill up to Congress.").

